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THE UNF ORTUNATE LIFE AND MERCIFUL DEATH 
OF THE A VOIDANCE POWERS UNDER SECTION 
103 OF THE DURBIN-DELAHUNT BILL: WHAT 
WERE THEY THINKING? 
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr.* 
lNTRODUCTIO 
This Article seeks to draw some lessons from the drafting, 
introduction, claimed justification, and eventual withdrawal of Section 
103 of the Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (the "2002 Bill") .  I 
The Bill was introduced by Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.) and 
Rep. vVilliam D. Delahunt (D-Mass.) on July 25, 2002. A week later 
the sponsors publicly announced its introduction by holding a jo int 
press conference and issuing a joint press release.2 According to the 
sponsors, the Bill was designed to "curb abuses that deprive employees 
and retirees of their earnings and retirement savings when businesses 
collapsc"3 and provide additional p rotections "from corporate practices 
that rob [employees and retirees] of their earnings and retirement 
savings."4 The Bill, however, addressed much more than "abuses" and 
unsavory "corporate practices that rob" employees and retirees. Of 
particular relevance to this Symposium, 5 section 103 of the Bill 
* The authors are. respectively, Pro fessor of Law. Chicago-Kent College of Law, and 
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Citations to the Unifom1 Commercial 
Code ("UCC"). including Revised Article 9, are to the 2002 official text. Citations to Fom1er 
Article 9 and Form.:r UCC § 9-xxx are to th.: l 99 5 official text of the UCC. Except where 
contraindicated, citations to title 1 1  of the United States Code ("Dankruptcy Code") arc current to 
September 30. 2003. 
I S 2798, l07 th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221. 107th C(mg. (2002). 
2 Press Releae , Durbin and Delahunt lntroduc:c "Real" Bankruptcy Refom1 Pack<lg::: cu 
Protcd \V orkers and Retirees from Corporate ivlisconcluct (July 31, 2002) [hereinafter Pre�s 
Release 1. uFoiloble a: http://durbi n.sena te.gov/-durbin/new200 I /press/2002/07 /2002904 854 
.hun!. 
3fd 
-+ Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (Durbin-Delahunt), S. 2798, H.R. 5221, I 07th 
Cong., Secrion-By-Section Summary, available at http://www.abiworlcl.org/summaty.html 
[hereinafter Summary]. 
5 On April 7, 2003, we presented an outline of this Article at a symposium conference 
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("Section 1 03 ") would have expanded substantially a bankruptcy 
trustee ' s  power to avoid (set aside) a debtor ' s  prebankruptcy transfers of 
property, including transfers of security interests in personal property.6 
By the beginning of the American Bar Association's  2002 Annual 
Meeting in early August, many of the attendees specializing in the law 
of secured transactions and bankruptcy had become aware of  the Bi l l's 
introduction. Many of them had not read the B i l l ,  however, and were 
surprised to learn of its breadth. The sponsors explained that Section 
103 was a response to the recent enactment of revised Uniform 
Commercial Code ("UCC") Article  9.7 Section 1 03 ,  they wrote, 
"restores to trustees in bankruptcy the abi l ity to review and set aside 
suspect transactions which they enj oyed as l ien creditors under Article 9 
of the Uniform Commercial  Code prior to the UCC amendments."8 
However, a c loser look at the text of Section 1 03 revealed that it would 
have done far more than restore the status quo ante. It would have 
empowered trustees in bankruptcy to set aside a multitude of routine 
secured transactions that have formed part of the financial landscape for 
decades, even before the Bankruptcy Code was first enactcd.9 
During the meeting a "rump" group of practicing lawyers and 
academics came together to discuss their opposition to the secured­
transactions-re lated provisions of the Bi l l, includ ing S ection 103. In the 
days fol lowing the meet ing a few more pa11ic ipants jo ined the group . 
The group made its chief order of business the preparation of a report 
that would explain the problems with the B il l  and generate opposition to 
it. 10 
entitled "Threats to Secured Lending and Asset Securitization" ("Symposium"), sponsored by the 
Cardozo Lcnv Re�•ie\\'. Papers and outlines presented at the Symposium are the basis for this 
Symposium issue of the Cardozo Law Review. 
6 Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (Durbin-Delahum) � l 03. The Bill contained 
several other provisions that would have gone well beyond addressing corporate abuses. One 
provision would have established a new class of administrative expenses and atforded these 
expenses a "super" priority over secured claims. See id. § 203. Another provision would have 
established a new, vague, federal bankruptcy-law test for recharactcrizing a prcbankruptcy sale, 
lease, or other transfer of property as a secured loan. The new test would have replaced the 
generally applicable and settled state-law tests. See id § I 02. By addressing only Section 103 of 
the Bill in this Article, we do not inte nd to suggest our endorsement or :he other secured­
transaction-related provisi0ns of the 13i II. 
7 Revised Article 9 became effective in forty-six states and the District of Columbia on July 
I, 2001. By January I, 2002. it was effective in all fifty states. Sec Uniform Commercial Code 
Reporting Service. U. C. C. Seurch, State Variations and Fees (Thomson West. Sept. 2003). 
8 Summary, supra note 4; see also Press Release, supra note 2 ("(Section I 03] restores to 
bankmptcy trustees the full authority to challenge and set aside pre-bankruptcy transactions that 
take assets out of the company."). 
9 The Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, at which time Article 9 had been in effect in 
every state (except Louisiana) for at least a decade. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 
96-598, 92 Stat. 2549 ( 1978); Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service, supra note 7. 
10 Professor Mooney took the lead in organizing the group during the ABA meetings, and 
both of us pm1icipated in the preparation of the Report. See infi·a note 12. 
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The group' s  apprec iation of the need to act quickly increased 
substantially when, in late August, Senator Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.),  
then Chairman of the Senate Judic iary Committee, scheduled a hearing 
before the ful l  Committee for Thursday, September 5, 2002, during the 
first week fol lowing the end of the summer recess. 1 1 By the end of 
August, the thirteen members of the group had produced a 26-page 
report ("Report").12 The Report offered a trenchant critique of several 
aspects of the B i l l ,  inc luding Section 1 03 .  By September 3 ,  the day 
after Labor Day, the group had circulated the report electronical ly to 
thousands of lawyers and c lients . 
While the group was working on the Report, many interested 
persons engaged in an ongoing and active discussion of the B i l l .  Some 
of the discussions took place with lawyers in the office of the counsel to 
Senator Orin G. Hatch ( R-Utah), then the ranking minority member of 
the Judiciary Committee, and with counsel for the Senate sponsors. 
Several interested organizations expressed to the sponsors their strong 
opposition to several of the B i l l ' s  provisions, including Section 103 .  
These inc luded organizations as diverse as The Depository Trust and 
Clearing Corporation and The Opt ions C learing Corporation (writing 
j oin t ly) , 13 The Bond Market Association, 14 and the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Unifom1 State Laws ("NCCUSL") . 1 5 By the end 
of the day on September 3, 2002, the Senate sponsors had thrown in the 
towel. The hearing before the ful l  Judiciary Committee ,  schedu led for 
September 5, was cancel led. 16 
From that time on, it was c lear that the Bil l  as it then existed was 
doomed. Revised versions of some of the B i l l ' s  pro visiOns 
subsequently surfaced, but the final nail in the Bil l's coffin was a joint 
I I  Nolice of Full Senate Judici<11y Co111111it1ee Hearing (Aug. 28, 2002), at 
http://judiciaiy.senate.gov/hearing.cfm'!id= 395. Chaim1an Patrick Leahy (D-VT. along with 
Scnatms Edward M. Kennedy (D-ivlass.), John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), and Jay D. Rockcfelkr (D-W. 
Ya.), co-sponsored the Bill in the Senate . See Bill Sununary and Status for the I 07th Congress, 
S. 2792, available at http://thomas. loc.govicgi-binlbdquery/z?d I 07:SN02798:@@@L&summ2 
=m&. The Senate was in recess from August l to September 3, 2002, and the House was i n  
recess from July 27 to September 4 ,  2002. Congressional Directory (online version) 525, 
avo i loh/e ot http :1 lviww. gpoacc ess. gov/ cdi rectoryli ndex. h tml. 
12 i\'1. BURKE ET AL., REPORT ON A \'OID.-\NCE, SU80RDINATION, SUPER PRIORITY, :\:\D 
RECHARACTERIZATION PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED EMPLOYEE ABUSE PRE\T)'(T!O:\ ACT OF 
2002 (Sept. 3, 2002) [hereinafter REPORT], http://www.hewm.com/use/articles/durbin­
Jclahunt.pdf. The Repon is reproduced as an Appendix to thi s A11icle. See i11ji·a pp. 1866-79. 
13 Letter from The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation and The Options Clearing 
Corporation to The Honorable Richard Durbin (Aug. 30, 2002) (on file with authors). 
14 Letter from The Bond Market Association to The Honorable Richard Durbin (Aug. 20, 
2002) (on file with authors). 
15 Letter from NCCUSL to Senator Richard Durbin (Aug. 30, 2002) (on file with authors). 
16 Notice of Full Committee Hearing Postponement (Sept. 3, 2002), available at 
http://www.senate.govi-judiciary/hearing.cfm?id=395. This development was personally 
disappointing to one of us (Mooney), who was scheduled to testi fy as a witness for the minority at 
the September 5 hearing. 
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letter voicing the strong objections of the Secretary of the Treasury and 
the Chairs of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.17 They wrote, in part: 
[T]he proposed legislation risks creating substantial uncertainty 
regarding the enforceability of a wide range of secured transactions 
and financial instruments that play a crucial role in the U.S. capital 
markets or otherwise facilitate risk management. As a result 
financial markets would be less efTicient--bonowers would face 
higher costs of credit and investors would receive lower returns as 
intermediaries were forced to charge larger fees to compensate for 
the greater risk and uncertainty. 
Accordingly, we ask that you eliminate those provisions in the 
Employee Abuse Prevention Act that threaten the operation of the 
U.S. financial markets.18 
Part I of this article examines the sponsors' claim that Section 1 03 
addresses abusive corporate practices by restoring to trustees m 
bankn1ptcy the avoidance powers they enjoyed before UCC Article 9 
was revised. We conclude that the claim does not ring true. The 
changes wrought by Revised Article 9 do not deprive lien creditors (or 
bankmptcy trustees) of the power to set aside abusive or even suspect 
transactions. Nor are the effects of Section 103 limited to restorjng the 
pre-2001 regime with respect to a distinct class of secured transactions, 
abusive or otherwise. The proposed avoidance powers in the Bill go far 
beyond negating the recent revisions to Article 9. By rendering many 
routine secured transactions ineffective in bankruptcy, the proposed 
17 Letter from Paul H. O'Neill ct al.. to The Honorable William D. Delahunt (ScpL 19, 2002) 
(on file with authors) (hereinafter Letter from Paul H. O'Neill et al.]. The Bill ··unoftlcially died 
in the Senate" on October 8, 2002. Shannon D. i\.'[unay. Bunkruptu Re/(mn Bill /Vithe,.s (Ocr. 9, 
2002). omilahle at http://www.thedcal.com. 
ll' Letter from Paul H. O ' Neill et al. . supra note 17. at 2. The Report. which had been made 
available to these organizations. reached similar conclusions: 
These two sets of provisions [sections 103 and 203] would sign ificantly impair in 
bankruptcy many nonpossessory and possessory security interests in personal property. 
These changes would effectively repeal. immediately and retroactively. much of 
Uniform Commerci a[ Code ('"UCC'") Article 9, thus relegating secured transactions 
law in the United States to the genre of legal regimes that exist in many developing 
countries, with the corresponding impediments to tlnancing and capital fonnation. 
This repeal would come not long after all 50 states. the District of Columbia. and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands adopted changes to UCC Article 9 intended to modernize the 
statute to facilitate the capital fonnation that is so cruc ial to the health of our national 
economy. Indeed, the sponsors indicate that the expanded avoidance powers in the Bill 
are specifically intended to override certain of these changes to UCC A11icle 9. The 
proposed avoidance p01vers in the Bill go far beyond negating the recent changes made 
to UCC Article 9. They would render UCC Article 9 largely without effect to support 
extensions of secured credit because many secured transactions \vould not be eftectivc 
in bankruptcy. 
REPORT, supra note 12, at 5 ( footnote omitted). 
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avoidance powers would render Article 9 largely without effect to 
support extensions of secured credit. 
Part I I  examines the startling contrast between the narrow, stated 
purpose of Section 103 and the section's potentially devastating effects. 
We assume first that, for whatever reason, Section 103 imperfectly 
reflects the sponsors' limited objective and consider whether there is 
any principled support for that objective or for the broader objective of 
protecting employees and retirees. We conclude that none exists. Then 
we assume that the text of Section 103 reflects other, unstated principles 
and consider whether those principles reflect sound bankruptcy policy. 
Here again, we conclude that they do not. Part III draws some lessons 
from the legislative process surrounding Section 103, and is followed 
with a brief conclusion. 
I. THE MISMATCH BETWEEN SECTION 103 AND THE SPONSORS' 
EXPLANATION OF IT 
Section l03(a) of the Bill would have expanded two of the 
bankruptcy trustee's powers to avoid prebankruptcy transfers, including 
the transfer (creation) of security interests in personal property: the 
"strong-arm" power in Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)19 and the power to 
avoid preferences in Bankruptcy Code § 547.20 We discuss these in 
tum. 
A. The Trustee's "Strong-arm" Avoidance Power�BanAntptc_t' Code 
Section 544(a) 
Bankruptcy Code § 544(a) am1s the trustee with the rights and 
powers of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor.21 Because the rights of a 
judicial lien creditor are senior to an unperfected security interest in 
personal property under UCC Article 9,22 § 544(a) generally empowers 
a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid security interests that are unperfected 
when the debtor enters bankruptcy.23 
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1). 
20 !d § 547. 
21 See id. § 544(a)(l). Section 544(a) also arms a trustee with the rights and powers of a 
hypothetical creditor who obtains an execution that is retumed unsatisfied, see id. § 544(a)(2), 
and a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures. See id. § 544(a)(3). 
We discuss the latter provision infra Part II.C.2. 
22 U.C.C. § 9-3 I 7(a)(2). 
23 There are some exceptions. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-317(e) (purchase-money security interest 
perfected within twenty days following delivery of collateral to debtor takes priority over an 
intervening (i.e., while the security interest was unperfected) buyer, lessee or lien creditor); I I 
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Section 103 (a) of the B il l  would have revised Bankruptcy Code § 
544(a) by adding to a tmstee's arsenal  the rights and powers of a 
hypothetical good-faith purchaser of property who gave value, rel ied on 
incorrect information in a publ ic  record, and either (i) took possession 
of  the property (even if the property was not of a type that in fact  could 
be possessed) or ( i i )  took steps to make the purchaser's i nterest 
invulnerabl e  to a judicial  l ien creditor.24 The trustee would have 
enjoyed these new rights and powers even if no such actual purchaser 
existed and even if no incorrect information regarding the chal lenged 
transfer actual ly existed in a publ ic  record. 
Some examples w i l l  help explain the huge, adverse effect Section 
103 (a) would have had on routine secured transactions.25 Consider first 
a typical  secured financing in which Dealer (say, a car dealer) obtains 
needed capital by borrowing funds from Lender and granting to Lender 
a security interest in Dealer' s existing and future inventory of new 
automobi les, together with a l l  receivables arising out of sales or leases 
of the inventory, inc luding installment sale contracts and leases. 
Normally, Lender would perfect its security interest by fil ing a 
financing statement covering the inventory and rece ivab les .  Because 
Lender' s perfected-by-fil ing security interest is invulnerab le to a 
subsequent judicial  lien creditor, Dealer ' s  bankruptcy trustee cannot 
avoid it under § 544(a)(1) .26 Section 103 (a) would have reversed the 
result .  It would have provided the trustee with the rights of a 
hypothetical "buyer in ordinary course of business" of the inventory, 
who, under UCC Article 9, would take free of Lender's perfected 
security interest.27 The trustee also would have enjoyed the rights of a 
hypothetical ordinary-course purchaser of the instal lment sale contracts 
and leases ("chattel paper"28) aris ing from Dealer's sale or lease of i ts 
inventory, who takes p ossession of the chatte l paper and g ives new 
value . B ecause such a purchaser would take free of Lender ' s  perfected 
security interest under UCC Article 9,29 Dealer 's  trustee's new rights as 
U.S.C. § 546(b) (prohibiting avoidance under § 544 when a generally applicable law, such as 
U.C.C. § 9-317(e), permits later perfection to achieve priority over intervening claimant, even 
though an interest in property is not perfected at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed). 
24 Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (Ourbin-Dclahunt), S. 2708, H. R. 5221, 107th 
Con g. � I 03(a). 
25 Readers who are interested in a more detailed critique of Section I 03 should consult the 
Appendix. 
26 See I I  U.S.C. § 544(a)( l ); U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2). 
27 See U.C.C. §§ 9-320(a) (rights of buyer in ordinary course); 1-201(9) (detining ''buyer in 
ordinary course"). 
28 See UCC § 9-102(a)(ll), defining "chattel paper" in part as: 
a record or records that evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in 
specific goods, a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods, a 
security interest in specific goods and license of software used in the goods, a lease of 
specific goods, or a lease of specific goods and license of software used in the goods. 
29 See id § 9-330(a), (b) (certain purchasers of chattel paper in the ordinary course. of 
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a hypothetical good-faith purchaser would have enabled the trustee to 
avoid Lender's perfected security interest in the chattel paper.3o In 
short, Section 1 03(a) would have turned a typical secured creditor, to 
whom the Bankruptcy Code nom1ally awards the value of its collateral, 
into an unsecured creditor, who shares pro rata in unencumbered assets. 
This result would have obtained even if (i) Lender and Dealer had acted 
in good faith and bargained at ann's length, (ii) Lender had perfected its 
security interest by filing a financing statement in the proper filing 
office, and (iii) the information in the filed financing statement had been 
complete and in all respects con·ect. 
How could a lender protect its security interest against its debtor's 
future bankruptcy if Section 1 03(a) were in effect? Arguably the 
lender's taking physical possession of the inventory and chattel paper 
would provide protection, inasmuch as the lender's actual possession 
might override a trustee's hypothetical possession. But, as the Report 
observed, taking possession of the collateral "would be practically 
impossible in the case of most inventory financing and ... often is not 
practical in the case of chattel paper. "31 On the other hand, the trustee's 
hypothetical possession might be read, quite plausibly, to override (or 
substitute for) the lender's actual possession.32 Under this reading, even 
the lender's actual possession of the inventory and chattel paper \Vould 
not protect its security interests from avoidance. 
Now consider the application of the expanded strong-arm 
avoidance power to a perfected security interest in equipment. Unlike 
the case of inventory and chattel paper, Article 9 provides no broad 
good-faith purchaser protection for purchasers of equipment 
encumbered by a perfected security interest. Even so, Section I 03(a) 
would have empowered trustees to avoid the perfected security interest. 
It would have conferred on a trustee hypothetical reliance on 
business who take possession of the chattel paper may obtain priority over security interests 
perfected by a method other than perfection). 
30 See Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (Durbin-Delahunt), S. 2798. H.R. 5221, 
l 07th Cong. § 103. As the Report noted: 
ln like manner, [Section I 031 also would permit avoidance of security interests 
perfected by filing in instruments (such as promissory notes), documents of title. and 
securities. U.C.C. �§ 9-3�0: 9-�31. Note that most of the good faith purch:1sc rules 
discussed in this section ( UCC �� 9-320, 9-330, and 9-331) had very similar 
antecedents that would have pro duced identical results under former (ie. prc-rc\ ision) 
UCC Article 9. See Former U.C.C �� 9-307; 9-308; 9-309. 
REPORT, supra note 12, at 6 n.7. 
3! Jd at 6. 
!d. 
32 The Report explained fi.trther: 
The same reasoning might be applied to [a] secured party that has "control" of 
intangible assets such as uncertificated securities or security entitlements, even if actual 
possession were impossible. On this reasoning even security interests perfected by 
possession or control would be vulnerable in bankruptcy. 
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hypothetical incorrect information in the filing office. Under UCC 
section 9-338(2), a purchaser who relies on certain incorrect 
information in a financing statement takes free of a security interest 
perfected by that financing statement.33 Even if Section 1 03(a) is 
construed narrowly, to apply only to cases where a good-faith 
purchaser's rights depend on its having relied on incorrect infonnation 
(and not, for example, to cases where a good-faith purchaser prevails 
solely because of its status as a good-faith purchaser),34 it would have 
permitted trustees to avoid perfected-by-filing security interests in 
equipment-and virtually all other security interests perfected by filing. 
B. The Trustee's Power to A void Preferences-B ankruptcy Code 
Section 547 
Section 103 of the Bill would have expanded not only a trustee's 
"strong-arm" power under Bankruptcy Code � 544(a) but also the 
power to avoid preferences under § 547. Section 547 generally 
empowers the trustee to avoid, as a preference, a transfer of property 
(including the creation of a security interest) made by an insolvent 
debtor to a non-insider creditor within 90 days before a bankruptcy 
filing if the transfer is on account of an antecedent debt.35 One cannot 
detennine whether a transfer occurred during the 90-day period or was 
made on account of an antecedent debt without first detetmining when 
the transfer was made. Bankruptcy Code § 54 7 (e) addresses this timing 
issue in a somewhat complicated fashion. In general, the timing of a 
transfer turns on whether and when a transfer is "perfected," as the tenn 
is used in§ 547.36 
A security interest or other transfer that is not "perfected" for the 
purpose of preference avoidance usually can be avoided. This is 
because a transfer that is "not perfected before the later of (i) the 
commen cement of the case; or (ii) l 0 days after such transfer takes 
effect between" the parties is deemed to have been made "immediately 
before the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition."37 A transfer made 
immediately before the petition is filed would have been made within 
the 90-day period and for an antecedent debt, thereby satisfying two 
significant elements of an avoidable preference. 
Section 54 7 currently provides that a transfer of personal property 
33 See U.C.C. � 9-338(1). 
3-+ See REPORT. supra note 12, at 7 (discussing this limited reading). 
35 See ll U.S.C. § 547(b). 
y, See id � 547(e)(2)(B). Bankmptcy Code§ 547(e)(2)(A) makes an exception. The transfer 
occurs at the time it becomes effective between the parties if the transfer is perfected no more 
than ten days after that time. 
37 fd � 547(e)(2)(C). 
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or fixtures  i s  p erfected when i t  becomes i nvulnerable  to a judicial l ien 
obtained by  a creditor on  a s imple contract.38 A security interest that is 
perfected under UCC Article 9 meets this test; a security interest that is 
unperfected under UCC Article 9 does not.39 By  replacing the judicial 
l ien creditor test with a good-fai th purchaser test, Section 1 03(b) of the 
B i ll would have s ign ificantly affected the time when allegedly 
preferentia l  transfers occur.40 Under Section 1 03(b ), a security interest 
would not b e  "perfected" for the purpose of preference avoidance even 
if the security in terest was "perfected" under UCC Article 9 ,41 as long as 
the security interest could have b een subordinated to, or cut off b y, a 
claim of a good-faith purchaser. Thus, in  most cases the security 
interests i n  i nventory, chatte l  paper, and equipment discussed above in 
connection with strong-arm avoidance also would be avoidable as 
preferences under Section 1 03 (b) because those security interests are 
vulnerable  to hypothetical good-faith purchasers who relied on 
hypothetical i nconect infonnation in the publ ic record. 
There are other s ecurity i nterests that would be exposed to 
preference avoidance were the judicial l i en creditor test replaced by a 
good-faith purchaser test .  Consider a consumer buyer of consumer 
goods from another consumer.42 Such a buyer normally cuts off a 
purchase-money security interest in the goods if  the secured pany has 
relied on automatic perfect ion43 and has not filed a financing 
s tatement.44 Being vulnerab le to the rights of an i nnocent purchaser, the 
perfected security interest would not have been "perfected" under 
Section l 03(b) and thus would have been vulnerable to preference 
avoidance. As the Report explained, "The Act would i nstantly change 
the cost/benefit analysis by forcing the [purchase-money] secured party 
to go the trouble and expense of fi l ing a financing statement in order to 
have a security interest that is effective in bankruptcy. These costs 
would, of course, be passed on to the consumer."45 
38 Sec id. � 547(e)(l)(B). 
3° See U.C.C. § 9-3 1 7(a)(2) (an unpcrfcr:ted security interest is subordinate to the rights of a 
juuicial lien creditor). 
-+0 See Employee Abuse Prcventiun Act of 2002 (Durbin-Delahunt), S. 2791\. 1-l.R. 522 1 . 
1 07th Cong. § !03(b). This subsection would have replaced the phrase "creuitor on a simple 
contract cannot acquire a judicial lien" wi th the phrase "good t�1ith purchaser for v�liuc of such 
fixture or property that reaso nably relieu on available i nformation cannot acquire an interest'' 
41 See U.C. C .  § 9-308(a) (providing that a security interest is perfected if it has attad1ed and 
any required public notice has been given, e.g., by filing). 
42 This example appears in the REPORT, supra note 12, at 8-9. 
43 See U .C. C. § 9-309( l) (purchase-money security interest in consumer goods is perfected 
when it attaches). 
44 See id. § 9-320(b), (c). The statement in the text assumes that, as requi red in U.C.C. § 9-
320(b), the consumer buyer docs not know about the security i nterest and gives value. !d. 
45 REPORT, supm note 12, at 9. 
1838 CA R D OZ O  L A W RE VIE W [Vol .  25:5 
I I .  OTHER P RINCIPLES THAT MAY UNDERLIE SECTION 103 
Having estab l ished that the sponsors '  statements conceming the 
modest effect of Section 1 03 were inaccurate (even if the sponsors may 
have be l ieved them to be conect), we now examine a series of 
a ltemative assumptions, explanations, and justifications that might 
underl i e  the proposa l . 46 We begin by asking whether any principled 
bankruptcy policy j ust ifies the sponsors ' nanow, stated goal of 
oveniding the effects of Revised Articl e  9 in bankruptcy or their 
broader goal of protecting employees of, and retirees from, bankmpt 
firms .  We then examine several other principles that might be thought 
to j us tify Section 103 and cons ider whether those principles are 
consistent with prevail ing bankruptcy pol ic ies .  
A.  Should the A voidance Powers Be Expanded to Restore the Pre-
2001 Regime '? 
The section-by-sect ion analys i s  of the B i ll suggests that Section 
103 was necessary because Rev ised Art ic le  9 deprived judicia l  l ien 
cred itors of certain rights to "set aside suspect transactions ."47 Two 
specific characteristics that Section 103 would have afforded to a trustee 
as a hypothetical good-faith purchaser---the purchaser ' s  hypothetical 
re l iance on hypothetical inconect information in the publ ic record and 
its hypothetical  possess ion of the co l lateral transfened-lead us to 
consider fi rst whether Section 103 can be justified by  e ither of two 
specific provis ions of Revised Artic le  9 that distinguish between l ien 
creditors and purchasers: UCC section 9-3 3 8 , which relates to incorrect 
information in the publ ic record, and UCC section 9-312(a),  under 
which a security i nterest in promissory notes and other instruments may 
be perfected by f i l ing. 
I .  Should the Trustee Have the Powers of a Re l iance Purchaser under 
UCC Section 9-3 3 8 ?  
v e e  section 9-338 provides, perhaps, the most p laus ib le and 
.J6 We do not speculate on the actual subjective assumptions that any of the sponsors or their 
staff may have entertained. Instead, we are working from the substance of the proposal and the 
explanation proffered by the sponsors and offering an objective, merits-focused critique that 
examines the assumptions and analyses that might p lausibly and coherently underlie the proposa l .  
47 See Summa1;, supra note 2 .  
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modest basis  for enacting a new avoidance power in response to 
changes made b y  Revised Article 9. That section, which has no 
antecedent in  Former Artic le 9 ,  enables certain purchasers, but not l ien 
credi tors, to cut off or ach ieve priority over an earl ier perfected security 
interest .48 S ection 9-3 3 8  protects a purchaser only if the competing 
security interest is perfected by a filed financing statement that contains 
certain incorrect informat ion and only if the purchaser reasonably  re lied 
on the incorrect information in  giving value .49 The re levant incorrect 
information for these purposes is the information specified in UCC 
section 9-5 1 6(b) (5) :  a mai l ing address for the debtor, an indicat ion of 
whether the debtor is an individual or an organization, and, i f  the 
financing statement indicates that the debtor is  an organization, a type 
of organization for the debtor, a jur isdiction of organization for the 
debtor, and the debtor ' s  organizational i dentification number or an 
indicat ion that the debtor has none. so 
To assess whether a trustee in bankruptcy should have the ri ghts of 
a purchaser under UCC 9-3 3 8 ,  it i s  necessary to understand the ro le 
section 9-3 3 8  p lays in the Article 9 scheme. If any of the section 9-
5 1 6(b)(5) information is missing, the filing office may reject the fi l ing;  
indeed, i t  is  required to  do so . 5 1  If, however, the fi l ing oftlce acc epts the 
fi ling notw ithstanding the m is s i ng infom1ation, the fi l in g  nevertheless 
may be effective to perfect a security interest .s::> 
Comment 3 to UCC section 9-520 explains some of the th inking 
behind this statutory structure : 
The infonnation required by Section 9-5 1 6(b )(5) assists searchers i n  
weeding out "false positives," i . e . ,  records that a search reveals but 
which do not pertai n  to the debtor in  quest ion.  Tt assists fi lers by 
helping to e nsure that the debtor' s name i s  correct and that the 
financing statement is fi led in the proper jurisdiction.  
If  the filing o ffice accepts a fi nancing statement that does not give 
this information at a l l ,  the fi l i ng i s  fully effective.  Section 9-520(c) .  
4 S  I f a qual i fying purchaser is a not  a secured party (e .g . ,  is  a buyer) .  i t  ·'takes free" of  the 
perfected security interest. Sec U.C. C .  � 9-338(2) .  If the purchaser is  a sc:curcd party. the 
perfected security in terest is �uburdinatc to the purchaser ' s  security i ntcrco; r .  5>ee id. � 0 -3 3 8 (  1 ) .  
-1 9  See id § 9-338. 
50 See id § 9-5 1 6(b)( 5 ). 
51 See id �§ 9-5 l 6(b) :  9-520(?. ) .  
52 See id §§  9-502(a) (speci fying inrormation required in  an  cffect iw financ ing statement to  
be  the name of the  debtor, the name of the  secured party or  i t s  representative. and an ind ication of  
the col lateral covered by the  financ ing statement); 9-520(c) (providing that a filed fi nancing 
statement containing infonnation speci fied in § 9-502(a) and (b)  is ef ective even if the fi l ing 
office is required to refuse to accept it for fil ing). A secured party who intent ional ly i ncludes 
incorrect information in a financing statement in order to mislead th i rd parties could be found to 
have acted in bad fa ith, with the result that i ts security in terest might  be subordi nated even to a 
purchaser who did not qual i fy for protection under section 9-3 3 8 .  See id § � I -203 (contract or 
duty under UCC i mposes ob l igation of good faith);  9- 1 02( 43) (defining "good fa ith" as "honesty 
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal ing"). 
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The financing statement also general l y  i s  e ffective i f  the i n formation 
i s  given but i s  i nconect;  however, Section 9-3 3 8  affords protection 
to b uyers and holders of perfected security i nterests who give value 
in reasonab le rel iance upon the inconect i n formation.53 
This approach induces a secured pmiy to include potentially useful 
information in the publ ic record, thereby providing a h igher qual i ty of 
public notice. But i t  does so without exposing the fil ing secured party 
to the risk that its security interest wil l  be unperfected, and thus 
vu lnerable to judicial l ien creditors and the debtor's bankruptcy trustee, 
if some information is missing or inaccurate. 54 UCC section 9-3 38 was 
designed to strike a rough balance-to impose consequences that are 
large enough to induce secured parties to provide correct information ,  
but are not so  l arge as to induce the expenditure of  substantially greater 
resources than the benefits of correct information l ike ly would warrant. 
Towards this end, section 9-338 rewards a competing secured party or 
other purchaser with a sen ior claim to col lateral only i f  that purchaser 
proves that it was aware of the contents of a financing statement and 
actual ly and reasonab ly re lied on the incorrect infonnation. 
Section 9-338 protects a very narrow class of purchasers outside 
bankruptcy. Even if one thinks the class should be expanded to include 
the debtor ' s  trustee in bankruptcy, Sect ion I 03 is drafted much too 
broadly. As the Report noted : 
The Act 's  expanded avoi dance powers could be curbed by revi s ing i t  
to  address only ( i )  the rights o f  a good faith purchaser that  rel ies  on 
incorrect i n fom1ation under UCC § 9-33 8  and ( i i )  cases in which the 
public reg istry actually contains i ncorrect i n formation in connection 
with the part icular transfer to b e  avo ided. Under th is approach ,  fo r 
exampl e .  i f  a financing statement on fi l e  actual ly contai ned incorrect 
i n format ion that did not render a securi ty in terest unperfec ted under 
UCC Artic le  9, the trustee wou l d  have the rights of  a hypoth etical 
pu rchaser that hypothetical ly re l i ed on the actual ly inconecr 
information. 55 
On examination, however, even this scaled-back vers ion of Section 
l 03 would be inconsistent with the stated rationale for Section 103 .  An 
error in the section 9-5 16(b)(5) i nformation is hardly indicati ve o f  a 
s u spect transaction,  let alone an abuse that  robs employees and ret i rees 
of their earnings and retirement savings .  Also, this scaled -back vers ion 
of Sect ion 103 would do much more than simply restore the trustee's 
avoidance powers to their pre-Revised Article 9 sta tu s . It would expand 
53  Jd. § 9-520 cmt. 3.  
54 There are a number of  reasons why i naccurate infonnation may appear in  a financ ing 
statement. For example, c lerical errors may lead to transposit ions of numbers in addresses and 
organ izational identification numbers. As the consequences of inaccurac ies increase, presumably 
the costs o f  ensuring accuracy wil l rise. 
55 REPORT, supra note 12,  at 15 (emphasis added ) .  
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the tmstee '  s avoidance powers substantially beyond those the trustee 
enjoys under B ankmptcy Code §§  544(a) ( l )  and 547(b) as they appl ied 
to secured transactions under Fonner Atiicle 9.  W ith the exception of 
the debtor ' s  mail ing addre ss,  Former Article 9 did not require a 
financing statement to include the i nformation now re levant to section 
9-3 3 8 .56  Any avo idance power based on inaccurac i es in the other 
relevant infom1at ion necessarily would expand, and not merely restore, 
the avo idance p ower. As a practical matter, Sect ion I 03 would have 
expanded the avoidance powers even had it been limited to hypothetical 
rel iance o n  errors w ith respect to the debtor' s  mai ling address. Less 
than a handful of reported dec isions under Fonner Article 9 held a 
financing statement to be insufficient because it provided an incorrect or 
incomplete address for the debtor. 57 
Moreover, incorrect information gives rise to a subordination or 
cut-off under section 9-3 3 8  only "to the extent that" the purchaser gave 
value "in reasonab le re l iance" on it . 58  Because a trustee in bankmptcy 
cannot actually give value, actually rely on incorrect information,  or 
actually be reasonab le in its rel iance, the only way to g ive the trustee 
the powers of a sect ion 9-3 3 8  purchaser is to provide the trustee w ith 
hypotheti cal reasonab le  re l i ance in  hypothetically giv ing value. Thus, 
even under a narrowed vers i on of Section 1 03 ,  the trustee c o u l d  avoid a 
security interest completely based on its hypotheticol reliance i n  eve;y 
case in which any portion of the relevant infom1at ion proved to be 
incorrect. 
Section l 03 arguab ly could have been nanowed even more, to 
place on the t: ustee the burden of showing at least that it would have 
been reasonable  for a purchaser to rely on the incorrect information in 
the fi led financing statement. But w ith no actual purch aser, no actual 
rel iance, no actual va lue given, and no actual context o r  c ircumstances 
surrounding the hypothe tical purchase, that burden no doubt would be 
56 See Fonm:r U . C . C. � 9 -402( I )  ( spc:c i fying i nfom1ation req u i red in an dle c t i ve fi nanc i n g  to 
include "a ma i ling address of the debtor' · ) .  
57 Our exam i nat io n o f  the Un i form Co mmercial Code Re port i ng ScrY ic� case digest !�Jr 
Fom1er UCC section 9--+02 revea led on ly four reported dec is i on . ; ( i mlcxed under ' ·Address 
requ iremen ts") in which an i ncumpktc or i na c cura te address was the basis fo r a dcterm inat iun 
that a fi nanc ing sta!cinent W<IS i nc!Tect ih· .  See Uni fom1 Commerc ia l  C\,dc Rcport i l lg Scn · ico..: , 
U. C. C. Search, Case D i g�st. supro not� 7 .  In one of these dec i s i ons. In re Michelic ·.1· Ho11mork 
Cards & Gi!is, Inc. , 2 1  ') B . R .  -' 1 6  ( Bankr. M . D. Fla .  1 99X),  the clcbtor ·s  iLimc was wrong. as 
wel l . The other three decisions were dec i ded decades ago, and two o !" them were dec ided by the 
same judge. See In re Wood, 33 B . R. 3 7 5  ( Bank r . D. Idaho 1 9 S 3 ) :  In re B ra'.VlL : U . C. C. Rep. 
Serv. 565 ( Bankr. D. Me. 1 9 70) ;  In re Brawn, 6 U .C.C. Rep . Serv. I 03 1 ( Bankr. D. !VIc. 1 969).  
Some courts. albei t  a minority of those that have considered the issue, haYc held fi n anc i m( 
statements to be adequate under Former section 9-402 even in the complete absence of a deb tor '� 
address where no prejudi ce existed. L i nes v B ank of Cal i forn ia . 467 F .2d 1 2 74 ( 9 th Cir. 1 972) :  
R i ley v. M i l ler, 549 S. W.2cl 3 1 4  (Ky.  1 9 7 7 ) ;  In re Fowler, 407 F .  Supp. 799 (\V . D. Ok la . 1 975 ) : 
In re French, 3 1 7  F. Supp. 1 226 (E .D.  Tenn . 1 970).  
58 u c.  c.  � 9-3 3 ::1 ( 1 ) . (2 ). 
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easy to meet. Section 9-3 3 8  itself contemplates that a purchaser could 
reasonably rely on any of the relevant inconect information. In effect  a 
trustee might  meet this sort of burden mere ly by showing that it is  
conceivable that a purchaser could actually and reasonably rely on the 
incorrect information. 
Because a trustee ' s  9-3 3 8-based avoidance powers must 
necessari ly arise out of a hypothetical purchaser 's  hypothetical reliance 
under hypothetical c ircumstances, i t  is impossible for those powers to 
mimic,  or even reasonab ly approximate, the actual risks that section 9-
3 3 8  imposes outside bankruptcy. In striking the balance reflected i n  
section 9-3 3 8 ,  the drafters o f  Revised Article 9 expected that actual and 
reasonable rel iance on inconect infmmation would occur only on "rare 
o ccasions ."59 Under the B i ll ' s  hypothetical rel iance standard, however, 
a trustee may "convert a rare event in the real world into an automatic 
event in bankruptcy."60 
Perhaps a very different statutory approach might meet both the 
objec tion to the hypothet ical  nature of a trustee ' s  rights and the 
argument that a section 9-3 3 8-based avoidance power in bankruptcy 
would materially increase the section 9-3 3 8  ri sk that a secured party 
faces outside bankruptcy. Consider an avoidance power that would 
a l low the trustee to assert the rights of an actual purchaser who,  on the 
date of the bankruptcy fi l ing, had an actual right to take free of, or to 
subord inate, a security interest under section 9-3 3 8 .  This power would 
be somewhat analogous to the tmstee ' s  power to assert the rights of 
ach1al unsecured creditors to avoid certain transfers (main ly fraudulent 
transfers) under Bankruptcy Code � 544(b)( 1 ) .6 1 However, the analogy 
fails because, at the t ime a debtor enters bankruptcy, a cred itor whose 
59 See U.C.C. § 9-338 cmt. 2 ('"On rare occasions, a subsequent purchas�r of the col lateral 
( i .e . ,  a buyer or secured party) may rely on the misinfom1ation to i ts  detriment. "). Outs ide 
bankruptcy the burden on an actual purchaser to prove reasonable re l iance woulu b� quite 
ui fticult to meet. Cons ider the example mentioned in the Report. 
[A ]ssume a prospective purchaser searches the pub l i c  record and finds a financing 
statement filed agai nst the d�btor's correct name. The searcher, however. notices that 
the address given for the debtor i s  not correct. ln order to benefit fi·om UCC § 9-338,  
the searcher would be required to convince a court that  it acted reasonably in 
purchasing the coll ateral in re l iance on i ts be l ief that the financing statc:rncnt ti led 
aga i ns t the debtor 's  correct name was not ti led against th� debtor, but ac tua l ly  was 
fi led against someone else altogether. 
REPORT. supra note 12. at 1 6  n .2� .  
60 !d at 1 7 . 
6 ! See l l  U.S .C .  § 544(b )( 1 ) . Under the accep ted interpretation of th is section. a trustee may 
avoid a transfer for the benefit of al l  unsecured creuitors, not just for the benefit o f  creditors who 
actually have the power of avoiuance, and the trustee may avoid a transfer  in its entirety, not 
mere ly to the extent of the claims held by creditors who acntal ly have the power of avoidance. 
See Moore v. Bay, 21\4 U.S .  4 ( 1 93 1 )  (app ly ing § 70e of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U . S . C .  � l l Oe 
( 1 976) ( repealed effective Oct. l .  1 979), the predecessor to Bank ruptcy Code § 544(b)( l ) ) .  The 
Court 's decision i n  Moore has been cri t i c ized frequently. For a summary of the critic i sms, see 
CHARL ES JORDAN TABB,  THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 6.6, at 346-4R ( 1 997). 
2004] D UR BIN DEL A H UN T  BILL 1 843 
avo idance power the trustee asserts under § 544(b) has only the 
potential abi l ity to . 
avoi d  . 
tra?�fers: it has not actually done so (by 
acqui ring a nonav01dable JUdicial hen, for example) .62 In contrast, a 
purchaser w ith senior rights under section 9-3 3 8  has actually achieved 
senior status through its actual and reasonable prebankruptcy re liance.  
What would be the effect o f  giving the trustee the rights and powers of 
an actual  purchaser who holds a senior interest? It  would be b izarre (as 
wel l  as p atently unfair) to enable the trustee to disp lace the actual 
rel iance purchaser for the benefit of the creditors generally, that is, to 
avoid not only the avo idable security interest but the rel iance 
purchaser ' s  otherwise nonavoidable interest as wel l .  Alternatively, 
perhaps the rel iance purchaser ' s  interest could stand while the trustee 
avoids, for the benefit of a l l  creditors, any remaining interest held by the 
junior competing secured party. That result would be inconsistent, 
however, with the effort to moderate Section 1 03 to merely mimic 
nonbankruptcy risks in bankruptcy.63 And it would clearly contravene 
the accepted pol icy implemented by the Bankruptcy Code of l imiting 
the rights of a trustee under § 544(b )( 1) to those of actual unsecured 
creditors .64 
In sum, even a narrowed Section 1 03 approach would cont1ict with 
the sponsors ' stated goal of restoring the avoidance powers as they were 
exerc ised before UCC Article 9 was revised. Any attempt to confer a 
sedion 9-33 8-based avoidance power on bankruptcy trustees either 
would expand the risks posed to holders of perfected security interests 
well  beyond those that obtain outside bankmptcy or would unjustifiably 
expropriate the priorities and interests of the very re liance purchasers 
that section 9-3 3 8  is intended to protect.65 
In h i s  response to this Article, Professor Ted Janger takes 
62 See, e.g. ,  U N IFOIUvl FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT S S  7(a) (2003 ) (stating general remedies 
of creditor as to avoidable transfers):  7(b) (providing that, if c ourt so orders, a judgment creditor 
may levy execution on asset transferred by debtor in an avoidab le tran s fer), 7A U . L .A. 3 3 9-40 
( 1 999). 
63 It also would fo llow the un f01tunate precedent of Moore v. Bay. See supra note 6 1 .  
64 See C O L L I ER ON BANKRUPTCY �� 544 .09[ 1 ) ,  at 544- 1 8  ( 1 5 th ed. 2003 ) . 
65 The Repurr noted two addit ional undesirable conseque nces ol a narrowed UCC section 9-
33 8-bascd S ect ion 1 0 3 .  First, because the i nc lus i on o f  sect ion 9-338-related incorrect 
in fonnation does not destroy perfection, one might expect more inaccuracies in that infonnation 
than in the perfection-related information. Thus, the Report observed. enactment of Section I 03 
would render avoidable many sec urity interests perfected before S ec t io n I 03 became effective.  
REPORT, supro note 1 2 , at 1 6- 1 7. In addition, the Report predi c ted that  enactment of Sect ion 1 03 
would prompt many state legislatures to repeal section 9-338 or el iminate the section 9-5 1 6(b)(5) 
infom1ation from financ i ng statements. I d. at 17. 
In short,  both the underly ing concept and the drafting of Section 1 03 were fundamental ly 
flawed. G iven this conclusion, i t  i s  understandable that two of the Report's co-authors, widely 
respected for their drafting skills and substantive expertise in the law of secured transactions and 
bankruptcy, dec l ined the invitation of a prominent bankruptcy academic to redraft Section I 03 so 
that it would "work. "  
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exception to section 9-3 3 8 . 66 W e  take Professor Janger ' s  princ ipal 
factual c l aim to be that unsecured creditors sometimes make credit 
dec is ions in re l i ance on inconect information contained in  financ ing 
statements . From this he argues that section 9-3 3 8  unfairly  
d i scriminates against unsecured creditors because i t  
·
benefits on ly 
purchasers, including secured parties . 
Perhaps a more coherent and straightforward statement of Janger ' s  
complaint would be that he believes that the information relevant to 
section 9-3 3 8  should be required as a condition of perfection along wi th 
the infonnat ion currently specified in section 9-502.67 Under such a 
revis ion ,  if  any of that infonnation were seriously m isleading then the 
financing statement would not be effective and the security i nterest  
would be avoidable under the cunent version of the strong-arm power.6o 
Janger acknowledges that this type of inconect infonnation  would be 
seriously misleading to an unsecured creditor only in "rare cases. "6\l 
Another plaus ible method of meeting Janger ' s  concerns would be to add 
l ien c reditors who actually rely on incorrect information to the c lass of 
persons benefited by section 9-3 3 8 .  Indeed, that would address 
prec ise ly the unfair discrimination that Janger c laims to be imposed by 
section 9-3 3 8 .  But given how rare such actual rel iance would be i n  
pract ice ,  Jangcr ' s  concern seems tri v i a J . 7° 
<•G Ed ward J .  Jangt:r, The Reliance !meres! in fnsoh·en1.T Low: A Response to Harris unci 
;1,;/ooney, 25 C.\RDOZO L. REV. 1 8 95 (2 004 ). Pro fessor Janger prepared h i s  response bcfurt: 
rec e i ving a copy of th is  Art ic le. H e  appears to have based h i s  respon se on th e brief outl ine we 
d istributed and the oral presentation we made at the Symposi u m .  
67  T h i s  is i mp l ic i t i n  ]anger' s argument for a ·'� i mplc solution" that woul d subject a l l  
i n fo rmation to  t h e  "seriously m is lead ing " standard o f  UCC section 9-5 0 7  a n d  Fonner section 'J-
402 ( 8 ) . Jd 
A� See supnt text accompany ing notes 22-23 .  
h lJ  Jangc::r. supra note 66,  at l l  0 .  The cases may be eve: I I  more rare than Ja nger surmises.  He 
pro ffers an exa mple i n  which a prospect ive unsecured c redito r  searches the New Y o r k  fi l i ng 
o ffice and di�covt:rs a properly  fi led finan c i ng statement naming a New York corporation as 
ckbtor but indicJting that the deb tor is inc orporated in  Delaware. We doubt the p rospective 
cred i tor wou ld be act ing reasona b ly if  i t  co nc luded that the fi nancing statement was fi led aga i nst 
a D e laware corporation h av ing a d i ffnent n ame and extended credit  i n  re l iance on that conclus ion 
( i . e  . .  we doubt that the i ncorrect i n formation is seri ous ly m is lead i ng) . Financing state ments 
n a m i n g  Delaware corporat ions are supposed to be ti led in  the Ddaware fi l i ng office. See U . C . C. 
� � 9-.30 I ( l ): () -.307( c ) :  9- 1 02(a ) ( 5 0 ) .  The debtor namd in the :\cw York fi l ing is 3 Nc\\. '{ ork 
curpu ra t iun i\ t  nw�t .  the in fo mwt i on in  the: fi nancing sta temen t would prompt 3 rea,;unabk 
searcher to inquire further. T h i s  might well  be th e case, even where , as in ]anger's footno te 22,  
t h e  ti nanc ii ig �tatcment su fficien t ly names both a New York a nd De laware co rporation . 
70 \Vc \\·onder whdher a prospect ive unsecured creditor ever trll ly extend5 credi1 i n  
reasonab le reliance o n  the percep t ion th at noth ing h a s  been ti led against the debto r. A security 
i n terest per fected ojrer the credit was extended nonetheless would have priority over a subseq uent 
j ud ic i al  lien that the unsecured credi tor might obtain .  See U.C.C.  § 9-3 1 7(a)(2)(A ) .  At most, a 
lien credi tor mi ght actually rely on i ncorrect i n formation i n  deciding to incur the t i me, trouble, 
and expense of ob ta i n ing a jud ic i al l i en . 
As to the materia l i ty of ]anger' s  concerns , consider as we l l  the smal l number of reported 
dec isions in which financing statemen ts were determ i ned to be ineffective because of an 
incomple te or inacc urate debtor's address under Former Article 9. See supra note 57. Indeed, the 
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Another response to ]anger' s  concern would be to el iminate a l l  
information from financing statements except the infonnation specified 
i n  sect ion 9 - 5 02 . 7 1  This  would have the benefit of excluding some 
i ncorrect information fro m  the publ ic  record, but no doubt at the 
expense of keeping a much greater amount of accurate information out 
of the p ub l i c  record. Yet that c learly would have been the result of the 
Article  9 drafting and enactment process had the drafters not devised the 
stmcture imp l icating reasonab l e  reliance under section 9-3 3 8  as a 
substihtte for requiring addit ion a l  information as a condition of 
perfectio n .  As the Report noted, " [t]he drafters o f  Revised UCC Article  
9 ,  and the state legislatures that h ave enacted i t ,  would n ever have 
required this addit ional [non-section 9-5 02] information to be inc l uded 
in a financing statement if the result of an inaccuracy would be the 
certain av oidance by the debtor ' s  tmstee in bankmptcy. "72 
The information that should be required for perfection by fil ing 
and the appropriate scope of the priority mle i n  section 9-3 3 8  are 
matters about which reasonabl e  persons m ight quibb le,  but  they are not 
matters we address in th i s  Article .  ] anger's  concerns have l ittle, i f  
anything, to do with the propos it ion that we are advancing here, that is ,  
that expandin g  the trustee ' s  avoidance powers to inc l ude the rights of 
hypothetical good-faith p urchas ers of personal property and fixtures 
would represent an enormous,  and unj ustified, extension of those 
powers. 
2 .  Should the Trustee Have the Powers of a Rel i ance P urchaser under 
UCC Section 9-3 3 0( d)? 
Section 1 03 would have given the trustee the rights of a good-faith 
p urchaser for value who took possession of the transfened prop erty 
(i . e . ,  the collateral) ,  even if the property was not of a type that in fac1 
could be possessed . This  emphasi s on p ossession le ads us  to inquirE 
whether the secti on may be j ustified as a response to the Revised Articlt 
9 ' s  perfection and p r iori ty rules governi n g  security in terests ir 
promissory notes and other instruments. 
Under section 9-3 3 0(d), a p urchaser of an i nstrument has priorit� 
over a security i n terest i n  the in strum ent perfected by a method othe 
repm1cd cases in which a trustee even bothered to chal lenge the su fficiency o f  a frnam:in 
statement based on an inc omplete or inaccurate debtor ' s  address constinrtes but a tiny perccntag 
of the cases in which trustees chal lenged the suffici ency of financing statements under Fonm 
Article 9. 
7 1 That would reinstate the formal requisites of a financing statement under Former sectio n  S 
402( 1 ) , with the exception of the debtor's address and the debtor's  signature. 
72 REPORT, supra note 1 2 , at 17 .  We also doubt that the drafters of the revisions would hav 
favored retaining the debtor's address as a component of the i n formation necessary for perfectior 
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than possession, if  the purchaser g ives value and takes possession of the 
instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase 
vio lates the rights of the secured party. 73 Comparing this rule to the 
corresponding mle  in Former section 9-308 ,  which also subordinated 
perfected security interests i n  instruments to purchasers who took 
possession of the instrument, one might wonder what the fuss is about .74 
The answer l ies e lsewhere in the revis ions,  specifically i n  the 
method of perfection that is available for security interests in  
instmments .  Under Former Article 9 ,  long-term perfection in  an 
instrument could not be ach ieved by fi ling; the secured party needed to 
take possess ion.75  Revised Article 9 adds fil ing as an acceptab le method 
of perfection. 76 This change means that a judicial  l ien creditor no 
longer can avoid a security interest in an instrument where the secured 
party has filed a financing statement but has not taken possession. 
As is the case with section 9-338 ,  the perfection-by-fil ing mle in 
section 9-3 l 2(a) impl icates good-faith transactions and not corporate 
abuses .77 And, as is the case with section 9-33 8 ,  the B i l l  is so broad that 
it would have affected a world of perfected security interests that were 
invulnerable to j udicial l iens under Former Article 9.7� Article 9 has 
always contained non-temporal priority ru les that, l i ke section 9-3 30,  
favor certa in later- in-time claimants, i ncluding secured parties.7° Whi le  
the 1 994 rev is ions t o  UCC Article 8 and the recent  rev i s i o n s  to Article 9 
added additiona l non-temporal priority rules to accommodate 
developing financing pattems,80 fi l ing remains  Article 9 ' s  principal 
7J See U.C.C ��  9-3 30(d ) ;  9- 1 02(a)(47) (defining "instrument" ')  
74 The � Ia�s of pmchascrs whom Revised Article 9 protects differs in some ways the c lass 
protected by Fonner section 9-308. Compare U.C.C .  § 9-330(d). H ith Former U . C . C .  § 9-3 08(a), 
(b).  Under scction '!-330(d)  a purchaser of an instrument need not take poss.:ssion in the ordinary 
course o f  business as Former section 9-308(a) and (b) required. 
75 See Former U C. C. � 9-304(  I ) . 
76 See U.C.C. � 9-3 1 2(a) (stating that '· [a] security interest in . instrument:; . . .  may be 
perfected by fi l ing. " ' )  
77 As \Ve explained elsewhere, perfection b y  fi ling for security interests in  instruments may 
material ly reduce transactions costs. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr . ,  Revised 
Article 9 Meets the Bankrupt(v Code: Policy and impact, 9 AiY!. BANK R. INST. L. REV. 85,  96 
(200 I )  [hereinafter H a rris & V!ooncy, Po licy and impact]. '·A perfection-by-fi ling rul e  'avoids 
the costs and impractica li ties of taking possession when the collateral consists of l arge numbers 
of instruments. ' ' "  ld n . 5 7  (quot ing Steven L. Harris & Charles \V. r-- ·tooncy. Jr. , /[(Il l '  Successful 
Was rhe Revision uJ L'CC Article 9. Rejlections a/ the Reporters, 7-i CHL-KENT L. REV .  1 3 57,  
1 3 6 1  n. l 6  ( 1 999)).  I t  also ··makes it unnecessary to determine wh e ther a partic ular writing is an 
instrument or to make alternative assumptions, necessitating both fi ling and taking possession.· · 
!d. 
7� See supra discussion Parr I . A .  
79 For example, t h e  predecessor t o  UCC section 9-330 was Fom1er section 9-308, which was 
quite sim i lar to the newer version. Compare U.C.C. § 9-330, ll'ith Former U .C.C. § 9-308. 
Former UCC section 9-309, which preserves the rights of certain good-faith purchasers under 
UCC A rtic les 3 ,  7 ,  and 8,  is ca1Tied forward in UCC section 9-33 1 .  Compare U.C.C. § 9-33 1 ,  
H·ith Form.:r U.C.C. � 9-309. 
�0 See. e.g . . U.C.C. ��  9-327 (stating priority ru les for sccur;�y in terests in deposit accounts); 
- �  �- , ,.� 
� 
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method o f  giving p ub l i c  noti c e . 8 1  Although i t  would be feasible t o  craft 
a nanow avoi danc e  p ower that would restore the pre-revision result, we 
see no b ankruptcy pol icy  that would require, or even be able to j ustify, 
do ing so.  Indeed, w e  expect that p ermitting perfection by filing against 
instruments wil l  increase the l ikelihood that unsecured creditors learn 
that a debtor' s instruments have been encumbered.SZ To the extent that 
the obj ections to sections 9 - 3 3 8  and 9-3 1 2(a) arise from a belief that 
secret l iens are antithetic al to bankruptcy policy,  it seems odd that the 
belief would lead one to obj ect  to perfected-by-filing security interests 
in instruments .  
B .  Would Scaling Back Security Interests in Bankruptcy Generally 
Benefit Employees and Retirees? 
The sponsors o f  the B il l  touted its virtues as a benefit for 
employees and retirees (presumably fonner emp l oyees).  The fol lowing 
passage, taken from the AugtLt 1 ,  2 0 0 1 press release issued by 
Congressman Delahunt and S enator D urbi n ,  exemplifies their clai m s :  
Pro mpted by the recent wave of  corporate bankruptc ies ,  Senator 
Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Congressman B i l l  Delahunt, 0-MA) today 
unve i l ed tough legislat ion to curb abuses that deprive employees and 
retirees of tbe i r  earnings and re t irement savings when bus inesses 
collapse. 
"From Enron to Polaro id, the recent wave of bankruptcies has le ft 
tens of thousands of employees wi thout jobs,  retirees w i thout  
pensions or  h ealth insurance-while corporate assets are diverted to 
executive bonuses and off-book transac tions," Delahunt sai d .  
"Some have asked, 'Why i ntroduce this  bankruptcy b i l l  a t  th is  t ime? ' 
To put  i t  s imply, there is no better t i me," Durbi n  said. "The 
con fidence of American workers and reti rees has been severely 
9-328 (priority ru les fo r securi ty in terests i nvestment property, deri ved substant ia l ly from Former 
U.C.C.  § 9- 1 1 5 ) :  9-329 (priority rul es for s..::curity i nterests in  letter-of-cre d i t  ri ghts) .  See 
genera/11· Randal C. Picker, Pe!fection f-lierarc/1ies und Nnnte111porul Prioritv Rules, 74 C' H I . ­
KE1'T L Rl:V. ! ! 5 7  ( 1 999) (ex pla in ing how pcrtl:ction h ierarchies may increase the amount o l· 
cred i t  �l\-:t il:.tblc to a gi ven borrower) .  
X I See U .C.C.  § 9-3 1 0( a )  (provid ing general rul e  that fi l i ng i s  n ecessary to  perfec t a l l  securitv 
i n wrests ) .  At least one commentator has claimed tlwt Revised /\11i c lc  9 has created � � 
"bi furcated'' system of perfection, with one set o f  standards appl icable to priority over judi c i a l  
l ien creditors (the trustee i n  bankruptc y )  and another appl icable t o  p riorit ies among competing 
security i n terests. See G. Ray Wamer, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act.· Re vised A rticle 9 unci 
Bankrup!Ly, 9 AM. BANKR. [NST. L. REV. 3, 32-35 (200 I ) . For a contrary v iew. sec Harris & 
Mooney, Polin· and Impact, supra note 7 7 ,  at 95-97.  
82 Pro fessor ]anger shares this  expectation.  See Jangcr, supra note 70. at I 07-08 (suggesting 
that unsecured creditors re ly on the Article 9 fi l ing systems). Under F01111er Article 9, a security 
interest i n  i nstruments other than proceeds could be perfected on l y  by possession or temporari ly .  
See Former U . C. C .  § 9-304( 1 ) . 
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shaken by an epidemic o f  corporate greed and corruption .  Th i s  b i l l  
says that if  a c ompany goes bankmpt a n d  engages i n  unfair practices 
in the process, the forgotten victims-employees and retirees­
won ' t  be asked to pay the price ."X3 
And, as reported by CongressDaily, '· [a]sked in an interview today 
whether the [Bill] was meant to be viewed as an altemative or 
complement to the pending bankruptcy reform legislation, Durbin 
responded: 'That was a bankruptcy b ill for corporatiorts. This i s  a 
bankruptcy bill  for workers. "'84 
'vVe have already demonstrated that Section 1 03 cannot be 
understood to address "abuses," "corporate greed," or "unfair  
practices. "85 In this  section we consider whether enactment of Section 
1 03 (or a narrower version, such as that outlined i n  the previous section) 
would be likely to accomplish the sponsors' larger expressed goal, that 
of promoting the interests of employees and retirees. We conclude that 
enactment of Section 1 03 in  any form would be unlikely to accomplish 
thi s  result. 
One knowledgeable source indicated that the B il l ' s  sponsors 
focused first on provis ions that would enhance the preferential treatment 
that the Bankruptcy Code already gives to claims of employees and 
retirees.80 These provis ions ultimately appeared in Title I I  of the bill .R7 
Sometime later the sponsors and their sta ffs realized what may have 
been obvious--more preferential treatment for employees and retirees 
would be hollow unless sufficient assets were available for satisfaction 
of their claims.i->8 The provisions in Title I, including Section 1 03 ,  were 
included so that "plundered assets" would be recoverable for this 
purpose. �9 
No one can deny that employees or reti rees who hold claims 
against a firm in bankruptcy will benefit  by having more assets 
<'3 Pr�ss Rek�se. supra note 2. 
84 COi\iGRFSSD •\ i L\. ( /\ugust I ,  2002 ), at http ://nationaljoumal .com/about/congressdai ly.  
X5 See supru discuss ion Part ! .  
X6 Sec. e g ,  I I  U.S .C .  �� 507(a)(3)  (2004) (affordi ng priority to  certain c la ims for wages, 
salary. or commiss ions);  507(a)(4) (afford ing pr ior ity to ccrt�1 i n  c l a i ms for cont ribu tions to an 
employee bc nc tl t plan) :  1 1 1 4 (requiring payment. and re�cric t i ng moJ i !icat ion, of retiree 
benc tib) .  
S7 .. Tit le  I I  of the  b i l l  provides a number o f  remedies to h e l p  ensure t ha t once the p lundered 
asse ts have bcc·n recaptured for the estate, employees and re t i rees have the opportunity to assert 
their claims to a l�t i r  share of the proceeds." Press Release. supm note 2 .  
88  I n terview conducted by Charles W. Mooney, Jr. w i th congressional staff member 
( December 1 2 , 2002). 
S9 Press Release. supm note 2. Of course, it i s  preposterous to sugges t that the transfers of 
col lateral that would have been recovered under Section I 03 consti!:ute "plundered assets" as 
opposed to legitimate commercial transact ions.  In a secured transac tion ' "assets of an equal or 
greater value (e.g., loaned funds or purchased propeny) come in as the debtor 's  property 
consisting of new assets, a feature the sponsors have not mentioned." REPORT, supra note 1 2 , at 
1 4  n.22. 
2004] D UR B IN D ELA H UN T  BIL L  1 849 
availabl e  for the payment of unsecured c laims and, where app l icable, 
priority c la ims .9° But once one assumes, as we do, that the firms against 
which most employees and retirees hold c la ims are not in bankruptcy, 
this observation sheds little, if any, l ight on whether employees and 
retirees genera l ly  would have benefited from Section I 03 ' s  greatly 
expanded power to avo id  p erfected security interests . The observation 
fails to take into account that the treatment of secured c la ims in 
bankruptcy affects the cost and availabi l ity of secured credi t .  One 
ought n ot simply have assumed that, after enactment of Section I 03 , all 
would remain constant and the financial p icture of debtors wou ld be 
ident ical  in bankruptcy except for the fact that collateral vvould be 
recovered for the benefit of employees and retirees .  This is not how the 
world works .9 1  Were Section l 03 to become appl icable to a proposed 
secured credit transaction, p rospective creditors would take into a ccount 
i ts effects. If  a p roposed security interest would have been avoidable 
under Section 1 03 ,  then the credit e i ther would not have been extended 
at all or wou ld  have been extended in a smaller amount or at a h igher 
cost. If  the credit were not  extended, then the debtor would not have 
acquired the loan proceeds o r  property in the credit transact i on and 
those funds or property \I'Ould not have become part (�l the debtor 's 
estote in bankruptcy. 
The Report emphas ized this instrumental effect of  Sect ion I 03 on 
the extension of credit, as did the President ' s  Working Group in i ts 
trenchant exp lanation that the B i l l  would hann the very employees and 
ret irees that its sponsors c laimed would be its benefic iaries.92 The most 
direct victims would have been emp loyees and fom1er employees whose 
employers would not have obta ined necessary credit or would have 
clone so only in lower amounts or at higher costs. Credit contract ions  
also would have affected those ind ividuals whom potential em p l oyers 
would have lacked the financ ia l  resources to h ire in the fi rs t p lace.  
Employees and retirees of firms that never would have en tered 
bankruptcy probably would have borne the brunt of Sect ion I 03 ' s  
effects . On the other hand, the instrumental effects of  Sect ion I 03  also 
would have fal len on employees and retirees of bankrupt fi rms that  had 
9 0  The statement i n  the text  as�umc:,;  t lw t  the li n n ' s  bankruptcy estate 1 1  ou!d  ! 1<\1  r > t i lc 1wisc 
pay the relevant claims in ful l .  The Bi l l  would have expanded the asset base not onlv bv 
expanding the avoidance powers, .1c:e Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 ( Du;·b i i;­
Dclahunt) .  S. 2798, H . R .  522 1 .  I 07 th  Cong. � I 03,  but also by subord i nating certa in secured 
claims to certain c laims of retirees. See id � 203; see also ! I U .S.C. � 726( a )  ( D rdcr of 
distribution to holders of cla ims) .  
9 1 Many traditional bankruptcy pract i t ioners and academics con�inue to  c l ing to th is  
assumption nevertheless.  See Douglas G .  Baird. Bankruptcy 's Uncontested Axio111.1, I 08 YALE 
L . J .  5 73 ,  589-92 ( 1 998)  (procedural is ts ,  unl ike traditiona l i s ts ,  emphasize the instrumenta l aspects 
of bankruptcy law); see also Harris & Mooney, Policy and Jmpacl, supra note 77 .  at 97 - l l  I 
(discussing the i mpact of Revised UCC A 11icle 9 on unsecured creditors). 
92 See REPORT, supra note 1 2, at 9- 1 0 : Letter to Paul  H. O ' N e i l l  et a l . .  supro note 1 7 . 
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been unab le to obtain necessary extensions o f  credit.93 The point  is that 
one c annot make any responsible assessment of whether Sect ion 1 03 
general ly  would h ave harmed or benefited employees and retirees of · i  
firms, inside or outside of bankruptcy, without taking into acc ount the 
instrumental effects of the p rovis ion, including its effects on the credit 
and financial markets .  
Like the sponsors ' c laim that Section 1 03 would have restored 
avoidance powers lost by the revis ion of UCC Article 9, the claim that 
Sect ion 1 03 genera l ly would have benefited employees and retirees is 
not supportable.  
C. Is the Expansion of A voidance Povvers in Section I 03 Consistent 
with Bankruptcy Policy? 
Sections I I .  A and B above examined the sponsors '  s tated 
justifications for Section 1 03 and found them unpersuasive. In this  
section we extract from the text of  Section 1 03 several other, unstated 
princ ip les that might be thought to underl ie the proposed expansion of 
avoidance powers . We conc lude that none of these principles reflects 
sound bankruptcy pol icy. 
1 .  Should a Security I nterest that ls Vulnerab le to A ny Other Claim 
under Any Circumstances Be Avoidable in Bankruptcy? 
One poss ible basis for expanding the avoidance powers would be 
to put a trustee, as a representative of creditors , in a position as s trong as 
that of every other person vis-a-vis a security interest .  Otherwise 
posited , the argument would be that if  anyone under any circumstances 
could take pri ority over or cut off a security interest, the trustee should 
have the rights and powers of that hypothetical person.  For 
convenience, we refer to this avoidance power as the "most-favored­
claimant" power. We find no sound bankruptcy po l icy basis for 
expanding the trustee ' s  avoidance powers a long these l ines .  
One way to test the merits of the mos t-favored-claimant avo idance 
power is to ask whether i t  would promote the policies underlying the 
princ ipa l avoidance powers ( i . e . ,  the "strong-arm" power, the preference 
avoidance power, the power to avoid fraudulent transfers, and the power 
to avoid statutory l iens).94 Consider first the "strong-arm" power, which 
9 3  These points raise empirical questions that we have explored elsewhere. See Steven L .  
Harris & Charles W .  Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and identifying the 
Victims of"Subordinating Security interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. R EV. 1 349 ( 1 997).  
94 See l l  U.S.C.  § §  544(a)( l )  ("strong-am1" power); 544(b); 545 ( statutory-l ien avoidance); 
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confers upon a trustee the ri ghts and powers of a hypothetical j udicial 
l ien creditor as of the time the bankruptcy case i s  commenced. 95 The 
strong-arm power i s  best understood by viewing the trustee as a de .facto 
judicial l ien creditor for the benefit of a l l  creditors. 96 Just as creditors 
could have obtained judicial  l iens outside bankruptcy against property 
subj ect to an unperfected security interest, so a trustee obtains a j udicial  
l ien on their behalf in bankruptcy and may avoid the unperfected 
security interest.97 Because the strong-arm power avoids unperfected 
security interests for the benefit of creditors generally, it complements 
bankruptcy ' s equal (pro rata) sharing principle . 98 
While the strong-arm power serves bankruptcy ' s  po l icy of equality 
and mimics creditors ' nonbankruptcy entitlements, the most-favored­
c laimant power wou ld  extend the trustee ' s  avoidance powers much 
farther. As explained above, for example, under Section l 03 (a version 
of the most-favored-c laimant approach) the trustee would have been 
able to assert the rights of a hypothetical buyer in ordinary course of the 
debtor ' s  inventory to cut off a security interest in the inventory even if 
the security interest was peifectec/. 99 The effect of avoidance under the 
.5-'l7(b) (pre ference avoidance), .5-'t8 ( fraudulent-trans fer avoidance). The Bankruptcy Code 
contains other avoidance po,,·ers. but these are not relevant to  the discuss ion.  See. e.g . . id � 549 
( postpeti t ion-transfer avoi dance) .  
95  See id § 544(a)( I ) . Section .544(a) also arms a trustee with the r ights and powers of a 
hypothetical creditor who obtains an execution  that is returned unsatisfied, see l l  USC § 
544(a)(2) ,  and a hypothetical  bona fide purchaser o f  real property, other than fixtures. See 1 1  
USC § .544(a)( 3 ) . We discuss the latter provision infra Part I I .C2.  David Carlson has argued 
that the trustee 's  strong-arm power is the organizing principle of bankruptcy. David G ray 
Carlson, Bankruptcv ·s Organi::ing Pri11cip/c, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV . .549. 5 5 5-59  ( 1 999) 
[hereinafter Carlson, Pri11ciple). 
96 As we have exp lained elsewhere ,  trad i tionally, upon the commencement of  an involuntary 
bankruptcy case, a trustee took possession of the debtor's assets; the creditors represented by the 
trustee thereby acqui red a l ien on the debtor's p roperty. Al though most bankmprcy petitions now 
voluntary, the result  should be the same regardless o f  how a bankruptcy case is commenced. 
When a judicial officer takes contro l o v e r  the debtor's property for the benefit of  cred itors, the 
creditors (or their represenwtive) thereby should acqu ire a lien. Like any other l ien that arises 
through the judicial  process or  through the exerc ise of  a col lective cred i tors ' remedy, the I ien that 
arises on bankmptcy should take priority over an unperfected security interest . See JOHN 0. 
HOl'"<'NOLD ET AL.,  SECURITY INTER ESTS I t  PERSO AL PROPERTY 44 1 (3d eel. 2000). 
97 See U .C.C s 9-3 1 7(a)(2 ) (/\)  (prov iding that an unperfected security interest in  personal 
property or fixtures is subordi nate to a per�on who becomes a l ien creditor before the security 
interest is perfected ) ;  9- l 02(a) ( .5 2 J  ( dc tin ing "l ien creditor"). 
% Once a security interest is avoided, the value of the col lateral is available for distribution to 
priority credi tors and then to unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis.  See I 1 U S C  �� .507(a) 
(priority c laims);  726(a) (order of distribution to holders of  claims). An unsecured creditur and 
the holder of an unpcrfected security i nterest are "equal," in  the sense that either could have 
succeeded in appropriating the value of the col lateral to the exclusion of the other-·--thc secured 
party by perfecting its security interest and the unsecured creditor by acquiring a judic ial l ien .  
The strong-arm power in effect declares a "tie" among the unsecured creditors and the 
unperfected security interest; i t  preserves the unperfected security interest for the benefit of alL 
See TABB, supra note 6 1 ,  § 6 . .5, at 3 3 8-39;  THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AN D LIMITS OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 70-75 ( 1 986) .  
99 See supra discussion Part LA. 
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m ost-favored-claimant approach. then, would be to confer benefits on 
the debtor ' s  unsecured creditors that would not have been avai lable 
under nonbankruptcy law. 1 oo 
Consider next the trustee ' s  power to avoid preferences under 
B ankruptcy Code § 547. Preference law enables the trustee to avoid 
c ertain prebankruptcy transfers that result in giving a part icular creditor 
more than its pro rata share of the debtor' s assets. 1 0 1 Unl ike the strong­
arm power, preference avoidance does not generally mimic a 
nonbankruptcy priority rule . 1 02 Instead, it "undoes payment and 
security of debt" that may be completely legitimate under 
nonbankmptcy law1 03 and may be completely invulnerab le  to an attack 
by unsecured creditors . 
Preference law can be apprec iated best by focusing on the effect of 
a pre bankruptcy transfer to one creditor on the debtor ' s  other, 
nonprefen·ed creditors . Assets transfened to a creditor shortly before 
bankruptcy, whether as payment or as col lateral ,  deplete the debtor 's  
estate . I f  the transfers were to stand, those assets would be unavai lab le  
in a Chapter 7 l iquidation to  satisfy the other creditors ' c la ims .  The 
creditor who receives the prepetition transfer is said to have been 
preferred to the detriment of the o ther creditors . When a transfer i s  
avoided as a preference under § 5 4  7(b ) ,  however, the assets (or the ir  
va lue) are restored to the debtor ' s  estate to  be shared by al l  creditors . 1 04 
Tradit ional preference j urisprudence suggests that preference law 
is designed to promote equali ty of d istribution among unsecured 
creditors . 1 05 By recovering a preference from the preferred creditor, 
1 00 A s  the Report observed, "[tjhe Act . . .  con fers on unsecured c reditors benefi ts that they 
could not have enjoyed outs ide bankruptcy . · ·  REPOR.T .  supm note 1 2 , at I I .  
1 0  I Section 54 7 (b )  provides for the avoidance of transfers, i nclud ing security i nterests, of a 
debtor's propeny that are made "to or for the benefit of a credi tor . . .  on account of an anteced.::nt  
debt ." I I  U . S .C.  § 547(b).  A transfer generally is not voidable unless i t  is  made whi le  tho:: debtor 
is insolvent and within ninety days before the dat.:: that the debtor's bankruptcy pet i t ion is filed. 
/d. The debtor is presumed to have been insolv ent during the n i n e ty-day period. !d. The ninety­
day period is extended to one year i f  the credi tor  is an ins ider. /d. In addit ion,  a tran,;fer is  
avoidable only if  i t  allows the cred i tor to ob ta in more than it would have obtained in a C hap ter 7 
1 iquiclation case had the transfer not been made and had the creditor rece ived its distr ibution in the 
Chapter 7 c a s.::. !d. This last clement nonmt l ly is easy fo r the trustee to estab l i sh .  Un les s  the 
c reditor would have received I 00 % of i ts claim i n  Chapter 7 ( i . e . ,  unless the bankruptcy debtor i� 
solvent ) ,  a prepctit ion payment necessari ly i mpro\"l·s the creditor's pos i tion .  The same can he 
said for a prepetition transfer of coll ateral to secure an antecedent unsecured debt. 
1 02 Some states also have preference laws, howe\·c:r. See, e.g. , 3 9  PA. CONS.  STAT AN"i. � 1 5  I 
(2003 ) .  
1 03 David Gray Carlson, Securit_v Interests i n  rhe Crucible of Voidable Preference Loll'. 1 995 
U. lLL. L. REV. 2 1 1 ,  2 1 3 . Professor Carlson has noted that voidable preference law "st rikes at 
transactions that are perfect ly legal and even admirab le at  state law." !d. For a c lassic treatment 
of preference law, see Vern Countryman, The Concepl o( a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 
38 V AND. L. REV. 7 1 3  ( 1 9 85).  
1 04 See I I  U.S. C. § §  550 (providing for recovery of avoided transfers); 55 1 (p rovi d ing fo r 
automatic preservation of avoided transfer for the benefi t  of the estate). 
I 05 See 1-I .R.  Rep . No. 595, 95th Cong. , 1 st Sess. 1 77-78 ( 1 97 7 ) ,  reprinted in 1 978 
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preference law prevents the creditor from retaining payments and other 
transfers of property that o therwise would have been shared more 
w idely .  By putting the preferred creditor in the same position as the 
other creditors, who have not been preferred, preference avoidance 
blunts the advantage that certain cred itors otherwise would have 
enjoyed .  
· This  j us t ification i s  cons istent with the current treatment of 
secur i ty interests under � 54 7 .  A security i nterest that is transfen·ed on 
account of  an antecedent debt  i s  e ligible for preference avoidance j us t  
l ike  the transfer of any other interest in  the  debtor ' s  property . l o6 A 
security interest that i s  created in exchange for new value ordinari ly i s  
not  avo i dable as  a preference . 1 07 However, even a secur i ty interest that 
is created in exchange for new value may be avoided if perfection of the 
security interest is delayed such that the act of perfection might be a 
" last-minute grab" by the secured party. l os 
S ome argue that preference law ought to do (and, at least to some 
extent, actually does)  more than protect the bankmptcy mle of pro rata 
sharing.  They assert that pre ference law should deter creditors from 
obtaining payment whenever the debtor approaches bankruptcy . 1 09 In  
their v iew, preference lmv should be (and largely i s) d irected to "opt-out 
behavi or"--acts by whi ch credi tors seek to remove themselves from an 
impending collect ive pruceeuing (bankmptcy) by "gun-j umping" and, 
in doing so,  destroy value . 1 1 0 vVhile this vis ion may be plaus ible in 
some contexts, most agree that deterrence is, at best, an incomplete 
explanation and justifi cation . 1 1 1 Indeed, many creditors probably 
U.S .C .C .A .N .  5963,  6 1 3 S ( " "the preference p rovisions fac i l i tate the prime bankruptcy pol icy of 
equa l i ty of distribution among creditors o f  the debtor"). 
1 06 See I I  U . S . C .  §§ 547(b)(.2) .  (c)( I ) ; 1 0 1 (54) (defining '·transfer" ). 
1 07 See id § 547(b)(2 ) .  ( c ) (  l ) .  
l OR U nder § 547 (e) .  unless a trans fct· i s  perfected within ten days after i t  b eco me s effect ive 
between the part ies , the transfer takes place at the time of perfection.  See id § 547(e)(2)(A),  (B) .  
For th is  purpose perfect ion uccurs when a contrac t creditor could n ot obtain a judici:.ll l ien that  i s  
senior to t h e  tran sfere e ' s  in terest .  Sn: id § 547(c)( l )(B) .  Thus. in the case of an .A rti c le 9 
secur i ty i n terest, perfec t ion occ urs u nde r preference l aw at the t i m e  the security interest i s  
perfected under Art icle 9. sc>e U . C . C .  § 9-3 1 7(a)(2), unl ess i t  is perfected under Art ic le  9 w i th in 
ten days after i t  attac he� . Sc·L· iJ � 9-203 ( a ) ,  (b) (a securi ty interest beco mes e n furceable when i t  
attaches) , A l though the  pu l icy  bas i s tor t h i s  treatment o f  delayed perfec tion i s  nut ent ire ly c lear, 
i t i s  consistent w i th thL' equal i ty-based j u s t i ticat ion for pre ference la�\·. Sec HO£\NOLD FT AL. , 
supra note 96, at 449-50 ( iden t i t)'ing potential underlying pol ic ies as a pol icy aga inst secret l i ens 
and an · . . anti-l ast-minute-grab" pul icy) .  
109 See, e.g ,  H . R. R1:P . No. 5 9 5 ,  95th  Cong.,  I st Sess . 1 7 7 -7'6 ( 1 9 7 7 )  (vo idable pre ference law 
mav di scou rage creditors "from rac ing tu the courthouse to d ismember the debtor during h i s  sl ide 
i n t� bankruptcy' ' ) ;  JACKSON, s upm note 9S,  1 .2 3-3 S .  
1 1 0 f o r  example,  t h e  removal of a key asset may d i m i n ish the value of the debtor 's  busi ness, 
and thus the amount avai lable for d i stribution to creditors, b y  an amount  substant ia l ly greater than 
the stund-alone va lue of the asset removed. When a prcfcm::d creditor receives cash, however, 
the detrimental e ffects on the va lue of the assets available for distribution to cred i tors arc 
considerably smaller. 
I l l Deterrence (when it actual ly occurs) also serves the equality pol icy by causing the debtor's 
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encourage a payment sooner rather than later in the hope that the 90-
day p eriod wi l l  e lapse before a bankruptcy petition is  fi led. 1 1 2 
One might argue that a most-favored-claimant avoidance power 
would serve both the equality and the deterrence pol ic ies of p reference 
law. I t  would, as explained above, result in most secured parties 
becoming unsecured in bankmptcy, 1 1 3 with the consequence that 
creditors would be deterred from taking security interests .  However, 
th is  argument distorts the meaning of the equality and deterrence 
po l ic ies as those policies are currently understood. The equal i ty 
principle does not require treating all creditors equally. The Bankn1ptcy 
Code gives effect to statutory, consensual, and j udic ial l iens i 14 The 
equal i ty principle refers to the equal ity of unsecured creditors and those 
whose property c laims can be de feated by unsecured creditors. 
Moreover, the deterrence pol icy is directed towards "last-minute grabs" 
that deplete the debtor' s bankruptcy estate . This pol icy already appl ies 
w i th ful l  force to the transfer of security interests . 1 1 5 Sec tion I 03 wou l d  
have converted preference law into a mechan ism for avoiding secur i ty 
interests that were given in exchange for new value.  
The third s ignificant avoidance power is the power to avoid 
prebankruptcy fraudulent transfers .  Bankruptcy Code § 548 empowers 
the trustee to avoid transfers where the debtor has actual iment tu 
dejl·aud its creditors and purposefu l ly attempts to put assets out of the 
creditors ' reach. 1 1 6 It also empowers the trustee to avoid gifts and other  
transfers that are constructively .fi"audulent because the debtor 
transferred the property when it was in poor financial condition and did 
not receive a "reasonably equivalent value" in exchange for the 
transfcr. 1 1 7 The trustee can avoid a transfer under § 548 o n l y  i f  the 
transfer was made with in  one year before the date on which a 
bankruptcy petition i s  filed. 1 1 x  Fraudulent transfers based on actual or 
construct ive fraud are avoi dab le outs ide bankruptcy as  we ] J . 1 1 9 
assets to remain in place for distribution to cred itors general ly .  See H . R .  Rep.  N o .  :'l 9 5 ,  95 th 
Cong .. 1 s t Sess. 1 77-7 8 ( 1 977) .  
1 1 2 For a bri ef cri t i que of the deterren ce rat ionale for voidable pre ference l a ,v .  :-;cc· C11·b() r 1 .  
supra note I 03. at 2 1 5 - 1 6. 
I 13 Sec SIIJHu discussion Part ! .  
i ! �  Set:". e.g . I I  U S. C. ��  1 0 1 ( 3 6 ) , ( 5 1 ) . ( 5 1 )  (dc lin ing ·j ucl ic i �; l l ien. " '  ··securi ty in tc rc·s i . ". � u tJ  
"stan1tory l ien"' ) ; 362(d) (provid ing for re l ief from the automatic stay);  506( a J  ( p rovid ing fo r 
determination of secured cla ims) :  725 (prov id ing for d i sposition of property in \vh i c h  a pebon 
other than the estate has an interest). 
1 1 5 See supra discussion Pa11 ! .  8. 
I 1 6 See 1 1  U . S .  C. § 548(a)( l )(A). 
1 1 7 See id. § 548(a)( l )(B) (empowering the trustee to avoid a transfer where the debtor ( i )  was 
insolvent, had insuffic ient capital , or had debts beyond the debtor's abil ity to pay and ( i i l received 
less than reasonably equivalent value for the transfer) .  
1 1 8 See id § 548(a)( I ) . 
1 1 9 See, e.g. , UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § §  4(a)(  I )  (2003 ) .  7/\ U . LA .  3 0 1  ( 1 999 )  
(actual fraud) ;  4(a)(2), 5 (a), 7A U . L A .  30 1 , 307 ( 1 999)  (construct ive fraud )  
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B ankmptcy Code § 544(b) empowers the trustee t o  avoid transfers 
avo idable  under nonbankruptcy law if an actual unsecured creditor had 
that power when the bankruptcy case commenced. 1 20 Under § 544(b ) ,  
the trustee i s  bound by ( and n�ay take advantage of) the app l icable 
statute of l imitations under nonbankruptcy law. I 2 ! 
The po l ic ies  underlying the trustee ' s  power to avoid fraudulent 
transfers afford no support for the creation of a most-favored-c laimant 
avo i dance power. The avoidance power under § 544(b) is somewhat 
analogous to the "strong-ann" power, in that it mirrors in bankruptcy 
the r i ghts of creditors to avoid fraudulent transfers under nonbankruptcy 
law. ' 22 As i s  the case with preferences, no expans ion of this power, let 
alone the vast expansion that a most-favored-c laimant rule would work, 
is  needed to accompl i sh this result .  § 544(b) applies to secured 
transactions w ith ful l  force. 1 23 Sections 548 and 544(b) also 
comp lement pro rata sharing in  the same manner as do the strong-arm 
and preference avoidance powers :  They return the value of fraudulently 
transfened assets (or the ir  value) to the debtor ' s  estate . 1 24 But, as we 
d isc ussed, the equal i ty goal does not requ i re the general avoidance of 
secur i ty interests or other J iens. 1 25 
In summary, a trustee ' s  avo idance powers under current law derive 
primari ly fro m  the rights that unsec ured creditors enj oy outs ide 
bankruptcy or comp lement the pr inc iple of equali ty and pro rata 
shari ng .  A most-favored-c laimant avoidance power would have 
prov ided to unsecured creditors ins ide bankruptcy the rights that d is t inct  
c la imants, such buyers of the debtor ' s  inventory in the ordinary course 
of business or new-value purchasers of chatte l paper who take 
possess ion,  enjoy outs ide bankmptcy. These and other distinct 
c la imants enj oy these nonbankruptcy r ights for sound commercial 
reasons. For example ,  the rul e  that ordinary-course buyers of inventory 
take free of perfected security interests promotes the expectations of 
both the secured party, who has entrusted the goods to the se l ler-debtor 
for the prec i se purpose of ordinary-course sales, and the buyer, who has 
1 20 See I I  U .S C .  � 544( b) .  
1 2 1 See TMll3 . .  wpro note 6 1 .  § 6 .5 .  at 3 4 5 -46. 
1 22 S,T Car !sun,  supra note I 03,  at 563-7 3 ( conccptu�d i z ing fraudulent transfer avoidancl: as a 
pan or the strong.-ann organ i z i ng princi p l e ' s  model  o f  the trustee holding a j udic ia l  l ien for th e 
benefit of a l l  c reditors ). We do not i n tend to suggest in this brief d iscussion that we think � 
S44( b ) , as it has been construed, represents sound p o l i cy. See supra note 6 1 .  
1 23 Section 5-+8 l ikewise applies to secured transactions with fu l l  forc e. One might consider § 
548 as mimicking nonbankruptcy powers but e l iminating § 544(b) 's  requirement that the trustee 
identify a speci fic unsecured creditor h aving the power to avoid the transfe r  in questi o n .  On the 
avoidance of fraudulent transfers in bankruptcy, see generally T ABB, supra note 6 1 ,  §§ 6.27-3 5 ,  
a t  4 1 2-34 . 
1 24 A good-faith transferee who took a construc tively fraudulent transfer for value has a lien 
on the property transfened to the extent o f  any value given in exchange for the transfer. See 1 1  
U . S.C. � 54(-:( c ) ;  UNIFORM FRAUD ULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(d) (2003),  7 A  U.L.A.  352 ( 1 999). 
1 25 See supro text preced ing and fo l lowing note 1 1 4 .  
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no reason to expect that the secured party would  obj ect  to his 
p urchase . 1 26 The reason for this rule has no app l ication to creditors who 
acquire judic ia l  l iens. Likewise, the rules that protect ordinary-course 
p urch asers of chattel paper for new value faci l itate the acqui s it ion of 
goods and promote the expectations of the parties . 1 27 The reason for 
th is  mle, too, has no app l icat ion to creditors who acquire j udic ia l  l i ens .  
The fact  that the good-faith purchaser priori ties in Article 9 have a 
sound commercial basis also suggests that the most-favored-claimant 
princip le  cannot be justified by B ankruptcy Code § 545. This section, 
which empowers a tmstee to avoid statutory l iens that are not perfected 
at the time of the commencement of the case against a hypothetica l  
bona fide purchaser that purchases the property a t  that t ime,  1 2 8 addresses 
state-created l iens that are enforceable only in bankruptcy . 1 29 Inasmuch 
as the po l icy underly ing the statutory-hen avoi dance power in § 545 has 
no appl icat ion to A1iicle 9 security interests, i t  should come as no 
surprise that Congress expressly excluded security interests from the 
definition of "statutory hen. " I 30 
2. Should a Trustee ' s  S trong-Atm and Preference Avo idance of 
Security I nterests in Personal Property and F ixtures Be Conformed to 
the Trustee ' s  Bona F ide Purchaser Status Applicable to Reed Property? 
The idea of giving a trustee in bankruptcy the rights and powers of 
a good-faith p urchaser is  not a new one. The trustee already enjoys 
1 26 See U . C . C .  § 9-320(a) ( buyer in ordinary course of business. as de fined in lJCC § 1 -20 1 (9) .  
rakes free of  perfected security in terest). 
1 27 See id § 9-330(a ) .  (b) (priority of purchasers of chattel paper who take possession in the 
ordi nary course of business). 
1 28 Section 545 empowers a trustee to avoid statutory l i ens that a re - - not pcrt(;cted or 
enforceab le  at the t ime of the commencement of the case <lgainst a bonJ tide purchaser that 
purchases the property at the rime of the commencemen t or  the ,· asc. \\'hcthcr or not such a 
purchaser exists." Bankruptcy Code S 545(2) .  
1 29 See TABB, supm note 6 1 ,  Jt 463 ("a  state statutory l ien that  has  a priori ty effect w i l l  be 
enforced in bankruptcy if  it is  bankmptcy-neutral") .  Even if � 545( 2 )  is  also viewed as 
implementing the policy against --secret I icns,' '  sec id. , i t  docs not ju�t i  fy \\ idcspread a\·o idan ce of 
sec uri ty interests. See infi·u note 1 4 5 and accompanying text .  
1 30 '"[St]atutory l ien' . . .  does not include security interest, whether or not such i n terest . . .  is  
prov ided by or is  dependen t on a statute and whether or nor  such in tere�t . i s  made fu l ly 
effective by stature . ,. I I  U.S.  C .  � I 0 I ( 5 3 ) .  ' "  [S]eeurity interest ' m.::ans i icn created by 
agreement." See id § 1 0 1 ( 5 1 ) . 
One might imagine a more modest version of the most-favored-c laimant avoidance power, 
the "most-favored-secured-party" avoidance power, which would ann the trustee in bankruptcy 
with the rights of a hypothetical secured party who holds a sec urity interest in  the same col lateral 
in which an actual secured pany has perfected an otherwise unavoidable security i nterest. 
Although nanower in scope than the most-favored-claimant avoidance power, the most-favored­
secured-party avoidance power is  l ikewise not supported by any thcoty or pol icy i mmanent in the 
existing avo i dance powers or otherwise. 
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those rights with respect t o  prepetition transfers o f  real property, other 
than fi xtures . 1 3 1 S ub stantial ly the same good-faith (bona fide) purchaser 
test app l ies  under § 547(e) ( l ) for determining when a transfer of real 
property, other than fixtures, is perfected (which, in tum, determines 
when a trans fer i s  made) for the purpose of preference avoidance . 1 32 
Would  the goal of conforming the avoidance powers for transfers of 
personal property and fixtures to the powers applicable  to transfers of 
real property provide a rati onal and appropriate justification for Section 
1 03 ?  We bel ieve the answer i s  no. 
The h istory of § 5 44(a)(3) is instructive in this regard. B ankruptcy 
trustees could not exerc ise the powers of a bona fide purchaser of real 
property under the strong-arm clause of the Bankntptcy Act of 1 898 
("Bankruptcy A ct") . 1 3 3  This power was added to the strong-arm c lause 
in 1 978  with the enactment of Ban kruptcy Code § 544(a) (3) .  The 
change was much less s ign ificant than it might first appear. Essentially 
the same result-the avoidance of unrecorded mo1igages-often was 
achieved under the B ankntptcy Act ' s  preference avoidance power, 
section 60 . ' 34 Section 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act provided that a 
transfer of real property occurred when the transfer was "so far 
perfected" that it became invulnerab le to the rights of a bona fide 
purc haser. 1 35 If a transfer was never so perfected, it was "deemed to 
have been made immediate ly be fore the filing of the [bankruptcy] 
petit ion . " 1 36 The result was that a transfer vulnerab le to the rights of a 
hyp othetical bona fide purchaser at the time a ban kntptcy pet i t ion is 
fi led fel l  within the then-app l icable  four-month preference per iod. If 
the other e lements of a "preference" under section 60a( 1) were satisfied, 
the transfer might be avoidab le under section 60b . 1 37 By adding § 
544(a)(3) to the strong-arm avoidance power, the B ankruptcy Code 
general ly conformed the strong-arm and preference bona fide purchaser 
tests for transfers of real property other than fixtures. I 38 
I 3 I See id § 544(a)(3) (bankruptcy trustee has the rights and powers o f  a hypothet ical  bona 
tide purchaser of real property, other than tixtures, from the debtor). 
1 3 � See id §§ 547(e) ( l ) (fixing t i me \Vhen perfection of transfer of real property other than 
tixturcs occurs) :  547(e)(2) (detennining when a transfer is made by reference to whether and 
\\·hen \he \ransfer is  perfected). 
1 3 3  See Bankru ptcy Act § 70c, l l  U .S .C � l i Oc ( 1 976) (repea led dTcc tive Oct. l ,  ! 9 7 9 ) .  
1 3'1 See id. § 00. l l  U. S .C . § 96. 
U �  !d � 60a(2), l l  U . S.C. � 96a(2) .  
1 36 Id Bankruptcy Code § 547(e)(2)(C) is to a simi lar effect. See l l  U . S .C .  § 547(e)(2 )((). 
1 3 7 See Bankruptcy Act § 60a( l ) , b, I t  U . S C .  § 96a( l ) , b ( 1 976) (repealed effective Oct. l ,  
1 979). Preferential transfers avoidable under the B ankruptcy Act were those that ( l )  were made 
within the four-month period pri or to the fil ing, "for or on account of an antecedent debt,'" and 
while \he debtor was inso lvent and (2) enabled the credi tor to obtain a greater recovery than other 
creditors of the same class. Bankruptcy Act § 60a( l ) ,  l l  U.S. C. § 96a( I )  ( 1 976) (repealed 
etlective Oct. I , 1 979). 
I 3!l Under section 60b a preference could be avoided only if at the time of the transfer "the 
creditor . . .  has . . .  reasonable cause to bel ieve that the debtor i s  insolvent." See Bankruptcy Act 
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The difference between the test applied to transfers of  personal 
property and fixtures ( i . e . ,  the judicial l ien creditor test) for purposes of 
the strong-arm and preference avoidance powers, and the test app lied to 
transfers of real property ( i .e . ,  the good-faith purchase test) general ly 
reflects differences in state law re lating to personal property and 
fixtures on one hand and real property on the other. I n  many 
j urisdictions a transfer of real property, such as by deed or mortgage, is 
val i d  against claims of the transferor 's  judicial  l ien credi tors even if the 
transfer is not recorded in the proper real estate records . 1 39 
C onsequently, if  a trustee were given only the rights and powers of a 
hypothetical j udicial l ien creditor with respect to a transfer of real 
p roperty, many secret, unrecorded transfers of real property would be 
invulnerable to avoidance. The bona fide p urchaser test for real 
p roperty then, effectively reflects a pol icy aga inst secret l iens and other 
tran sfers and in favor of pub l ic i ty . 1 40 
If any conformity is  des irable ,  Section 1 03 has it backwards.  The 
strong-arm and preference powers for transfers of real property should 
be conformed to those applicable to personal property and fixtures,  as 
opposed to the other way around.  As ide from fraud (actual or 
constructive) ,  there would seem to be no bankruptcy pol icy against 
secret l iens and thus no reason to arm a trustee with the power to avoid 
them if  they cannot be avoided by creditors outs i de ban kruptcy. 1 4 1 In 
contrast, applying a good-faith p urchaser test to transfers of personal  
p roperty and fixtures would have disastrous effects on  the credit 
markets, for the simple reason that certain dist inct good-fa i th purchasers 
of personal property and fixtures have such powerful  r ights against even 
p erfected secur i ty interests . 142 As the Report exp lained: 
a bona fide purchaser test for detem1ining when a transfer of 
§ 60b, 1 1  U . S . C .  § 96b ( 1 976) (repeal ed effective Oct. 1 ,  1 9 79) .  The Bankruptcy Code does not 
contain a comparable scienter requirement. See Bankruptcy Code § 54 7(b ).  
1 39 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 64,  � 547.06[ l ] , at 547-84.  
1 40 
Section 547(e ) puts a premium on prompt performa nce of whatever act is necessary 
under local law to perfect a transfer of real property. This  encourages open deal i ng and 
safeguards the debtor ' s  genera] creditors from the probkm c reated by the perfection of 
secret l i ens  shortly before the debtor fi l es a petition fo r re l i e f  umkr t i t le  I I .  
COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY. supra note 64, ,] 547.06 [3] ,  at 547-85 .  A ccord Ti\BB, supra note 6 1 ,  
§ 6 .4,  at 34 1 ("The probable intention of Congress [ in enacting I I  LJ.S .C .  � 544(a)(3)]  was to deal 
broadly with the whole problem of ostensible ownership ."). 
1 4 1 TABB , supra note 6 1 ,  § 6.4, at 3 4 1  ("The difficulty is  that there is no obvious bankruptcy 
pol icy that d ictates reso lving the ostensible ownership issue differently inside a bankruptcy case 
than it is  under non bankruptcy law."). The best solution to the problem of secret real-property 
interests might be to refonn nonbankruptcy Jaw to afford judicial  l ien creditors rights with respect 
to unrecorded transfers. Cf U.C.C. § 9-3 1 7(a)-(d) (providing that an unperfected security 
interest in personal property and fixtures generally is subordinate to the rights of judicial l ien 
creditors, buyers, lessees, and l icensees). 
1 42 See supra discussion Part ! . A .  
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p ersonal property occurs for preference purposes was abandoned 
more than 50 years ago because it did not work and substantially 
impeded the development and use of secured credit. In 1 950,  
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act so as to override the 
(in)famous case of Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klcntder. 1 43 
The then effective Bankruptcy Act conferred on the trustee, in 
exerci sing its power to avoid preferences, the rights of a hypothetical 
bona fide purchaser of personal property (assigned accounts 
receivable, in Klauder) . Klauder, in effect, also gave the tmstee the 
rights of a hypothetical  p urchaser that was the first ass i gnee to give 
notice to the underlying account obl igor. From the 1 950  amendment 
forward, the test for transfers of personal property in the context of 
preference avoidance has been based on the priority of a hypothetical 
j udic ia l  lien creditor. 1 44 
1 8 59 
In sum, even if  the good-faith purchaser test is j ustified for real 
property, d ifferences between the l aw of real property and the law of 
personal property and fixtures make the test inappropriate for transfers 
of the l atter. 
I I I .  LESSONS FROM T H E  A U S P ICIOUS B EGINNING S AN D lGNOlvl f N IOUS 
DEMISE OF SECTION 1 03 :  CO M PET E! CE, INTEGRITY , AND TRA S PARENCY 
IN LAW REFORM 
In the preceding Part we sought, w ithout success, to i dentify a 
plausible rationale for an expansion of the trustee ' s  avoidance powers 
e i ther along the l ines of Section 1 03 or along the narrower I ines of the 
sponsors ' explanation of the section. In  this Part we suggest possible 
failures in th e legislative process that may have led to this fl awed 
l egi slation and to the striking conflict between the expression of the 
sponsors ' intentions and the effects of thc B i l l  as introduced. 
S ection 1 0 3 is  not the first poorly conceived, i l l-advised, and badly 
drafted legislation introduced in Congress,  and, no doubt, it is  not the 
last. From one perspective, the legislative process worked.  The 
eventual fai lure of the B il l ,  and Section 1 03 in p articular, provides an 
example of a successful  effort to oppose the enac tment o f  unwise 
l egis lation. Yet the costs of resistance were high. A large number and 
wide range of interested organizations and individuals spent a great 
amount of time at considerab le expense to thwart the b i l l .  Lobbyists 
and lawyers do not come cheap .  Even regulators within the federal 
govcmment found it necessary to forge a prompt, coordinated response 
to explain to the sponsors that the legislation would wreak consi derable  
1 43 3 1 8  U.S.  434 ( 1 943 ) .  
1 44 REPORT, supra note 12,  at 1 3  (some footnotes omitted) . 
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harm to  the very employees whom the sponsors c laimed they w ished to 
protect . l 45 The legislative process would have worked much better had 
Section 1 03 never been introduced or been scheduled for a committee 
hearing . 
What went wrong? What lessons should we take from the 
introduction and eventual  withdrawal of Section 1 03 ?  We identify three 
aspects of thi s  fai lure of the legislative process that may suggest useful 
lessons for those involved with law reform-related activities :  
competence, truthfulness, and transparency . 
The individuals who participated in the drafting and review of 
Sect ion 1 03 may have intended to craft a provis ion that mere ly would 
have rolled back the clock on Article 9 for purposes of the avoidance 
powers . I f  so, they certainly fai led in the i r  efforts . This  raises a 
question of competence in drafting. Even more worrisome i s  the fact 
that anyone who understood Section 1 03 would have known that the 
sponsors ' stated explanation of its purpose was not correct. Any bel ief 
that Sect ion 1 03 ,  as drafted, was consistent with that exp lanation also 
would suggest a lack of competence, in understanding how the 
provis ion actua l ly  would work and how it would affect routine 
financing transact ions.  
Alternat ive ly ,  the confl i ct between the sponsors ' ex planation of 
Section 1 03 and its substance raises question of  truthfulness and candor. 
We have no means of determini ng the sponsors ' subj ective motivations 
for including Section 1 03 in  the b i l l .  From an obj ective perspective, 
however, there is reason to be skeptical that benefits for employees and 
retirees had much to do with the section, except perhaps in the most 
s impl i stic sense discussed above . 1 46 Even if  Section 1 03 would have 
freed up assets by avoiding security interests ,  1 47 these assets would have 
become available to satisfy all c laims, not j ust the c laims of emp loyees 
and retirees .  Viewed in th is l ight, both Sect ion l 03 as originally 
proposed and the narrower versions discussed above can be seen as a 
direct assau l t  on security interests, an assaul t  that i s  unre lated to the 
interests of employees and retirees. 
One might ask : If  the sponsors actua l ly believed that greater 
powers to avoid security interests would be best for employees and 
retirees (or anyone e lse), why then d id Sect ion I 03 attack security 
interests only i ndirectly ( through the hypothetical re l iance purchaser 
re ly ing on hypothetical incorrec t information) rath er than scale back 
1 45 See Letter from Paul H. O 'Neill et a! . ,  supra note 1 7. 
1 46 See supra note 94.  
1 47 As we explain e l sewhere, we doubt that it would have had that  effect in any large measure 
going forward. See supra text fo l lowing note 95. However, if Sec tion l 03 were enacted and its 
proposed retroactive application were upheld as constitutional, the Section might have had that 
effect in the case of pre-enactment secured transactions rendered avoi dable by the retroactive 
effect. 
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secured claims more directly and straightforwardly? One answer may 
be that measuring avoidance powers by using the rights of a 
hypothetical nonbankruptcy c l aimant would be more in  keeping with 
the traditions of the B ankruptcy Code. 1 48 However, motives apart from 
the desire for statutory consistency may have been involved. Those 
who drafted Sect ion 1 03 may have chosen to invoke the rights of a 
hypothetical good-faith purchaser to give the appearance of  pursuing a 
principle  different from a s imp l e  scale-back . An indirect attack would 
be more difficult to discover than a direct frontal assault .  It is not 
inconceivable that UCC sections 9-3 3 8  and 9-3 1 2(a) may have been 
used as cover for the sponsors ' c laim that the purpose of the section was 
merely to return to the status quo ante under Former Art ic le 9 _ 1 49 
We have been led to bel ieve that some individuals involved in the 
process reasonab ly re l ied on others whom they believed to be 
competent and rel iable .  I t  may be that this reliance was misplaced, and 
that one or more otherwise competent individuals produced an 
unsatisfactory product or gave poor advice. It may also be that some 
individuals involved with Section l 03 were quite competent b ut 
intended the broad impact that Section 1 03 actual ly would have had on 
secured financ ing rather than the comparatively modest effects c laimed 
by the sponsors. We have been told that the sponsors of the B i l l  and 
some of their staff were s urprised by the strength of the opposition to 
Sect ion 1 03 and several other provis ions of the Bi l l .  This surprise may 
have resulted from the fai lure of the sponsors and their staffs to 
understand the w ide impact that Section 1 03 would have imposed on 
routine transactions . 1 50 The possibi l ity that peop le upon whom the 
sponsors and their staff re l ied were not forthcoming in disc losing their 
intentions raises yet another question of candor. 1 5 1  
Did someone fai l  to forthrightly inform the sponsors and their staff 
members about the true nature of Section 1 03?  I t  is certa inly possib le  
that Section I 03 was proposed and supported by bankruptcy experts 
who opposed Revised Article 9 nnd who wished to render many secured 
1 4� See, e.g , l l  U S . C . �� 544( :.!) ,  547(c) .  
l -+'J  See generull_v supra Jisc us:;ion Part I (di scussing th� inconsistency between Sect ion I 03 
and the sponsors' c l a i m  that the s•:c t i �_,n ro l b  back the revisions to UCC r\ rt ick 9 )  
1 50 The fact that Senator Durbin has shown sensitiv ity t o  the concerns o f  busi nesses, including 
thc small busi nesses that would have beef' l i kely to suffer had Section I 03 been enacted, le nds 
support to this hypothesi s .  See M i ke i )orning, Senators reverse roles on business. Fitzgerald, 
/)urbin buck porly /renc/.5, C H I .  TRI B . ,  Aug . 26, 2002, at News l (''The l iberal Durb i n .  son of a 
stevedore and a longti me al ly of organized labor, increasingly is seen by many I l l inois  bu s i ness 
leaders as the go-to man to represent their  i nterests in the Senate."). Some earl ier  bankruptcy 
reform effo11s by Senator Durbin did not retlect the attitude reflected in Section 1 0 3 .  See , e.g , 
Consumer Bankn1ptcy Rcfonn Act o f  1 998,  S .  1 3 0 1 ,  I 05th Cong. ( 1 998) ;  Consumer Bankruptcy 
Refom1 Act of 1 999, S. 945 , I 06th Cong. ( 1 999). 
! 5 1  This also implicates the competence of the sponsors and staff members in their fai l u re to 
appreciate the effects of Section I 03 based on their own knowl edge and cxpcrience. 
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transactions less effective, i f  not ineffective, i n  bankruptcy,  thereby 
snatching victory from the j aws of the past defeat. 1 52 This hypothesis 
finds at least some support in the Final Report of the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission and in the process leading up to the 
Final Report. 1 53 The fact that the Commission ' s  recommendations 
make l ittle mention of the avoidance powers provides strong evidence 
that responsible,  mainstream bankruptcy professionals and academics, 
at l east, saw no need for a material expansion of those powers . 1 54 We 
also have no reason to believe that the Commission had any concerns 
about the direction of Revised Artic le 9 ,  the detail s  of which ( including 
the substance of what became section 9-3 3 8 ) were in the public domain 
as the Commiss ion finalized its report in 1 997 . 1 55 
1 52 The defeat, o f  course, was the overwhelming rej ection of the opponents' complaints about 
Revised A11icle 9.  As the Report noted: 
F o l lowing i ts  unanimous approval in 1 99 8 ,  i t  was presented to the legislatures for 
adoption, a process that normally takes 8 to 1 0  years. Because of the strong national 
support, the need for immediate adoption, and the lack of any organ ized oppos it ion to 
the changes, Revised UCC A rticle 9 was adopted b y  the legis latures in all 50 states and 
by the District of Columbia by J u ly l ,  200 I ,  and is  now effective in all 50 states, the 
D istrict of Columbia, and the U.S. V i rgin Is lands. I ndeed, Revised UCC Article l) 
enj oys the fastest adoption record in the more than l 00-ycar h i sto1-y of the National 
Con ference.  A rt ic le  9 has been consi dered the ''c rown Jewel" of the UCC for a l most 
:'0 yc:ns, being the most bold and i nno va t i \ e o f  the U C C s  articles.  Why would the 
l.! n itcd States Congress w ish to t1out t h i s  important and successfu l  domain of srate 
law'' 
REPORT, supra note 1 2 , at 1 4- 1 5 .  
We do not know who i s  responsible  for the draft i ng o f  Section l 0 3  or the sponsors 
description of its purpose. Desp i te our efforts ,  we we re unsucccssfi.I l in detem1 i n i ng the prec ise 
role that various experts may have played in the leg i slat ive process, and so we are l e ft to consider 
various possi b i l i t ies. One law professor informed us that another law professor had cl a i med to 
have drafted an early version, but he refused to reveal the c la imant's identity .  Other law 
professors to whom the drafting was attributed hav..; denied do ing so and were rductant to d i scuss 
their  pa11ic ipation in the leg islative process in any d etai I. Th e names of i nd ividuals art: not 
particularly important to the story, and identi fying part ic ipa n ts by name would not be partic ularly 
usefu l .  However, this information woul d  have been enabled us to trace the histo1-y of Sec t ion l 03 
ti·01n i ts earl iest  fo m1Ulations to the version that u lt imately was in troduced and so to h a ve avo ided 
some of the conjecture that appears here. 
! 5 3  NATIONAl .  BAl\'KRUPTCY REVI E W  COMi\ll SSION Frc.;,\ L REPORT, BANKRuPTCY: T! rr:: l\ EXT 
l\VENTY Y EARS ( 1 997)  [hereinafter N B R C  REPORT] . 
1 54 To the con trary, the Report noted that the NBR C  Report recommended restricting the 
avo idance powers. See REPORT, supra note 1 2 , at 1 3  & n . 2 l ,  citing N B RC REPORT, supro n o t e  
1 5 3 ,  Recommendations 3 .2 . 1 at  797-98 (tran s fer� o f  less than S5 ,000 may not  be sought in  act iun 
to avoid non co nsumer debt  preference); 3.2 .2  at 79l) -800 (preference recovery action of kss rhan 
S 1 0,000 must be brought in d istric t  in which transferee has principal business ) ;  3 .2 . 3  at ::>00-03 
( strengthening protection from preference avoidance fo r ord i nary-course payments);  4 . 2. I l at 955 
(cut back on Bankmptcy Code § 545(2)  bona fide purchaser test to provide federal tax I iens 
greater protection fro m  avoidance). 
! 55 A s  the Report explained: 
Moreover, the Commission must have been aware of the status of the p l anned rev isions 
to UCC Article 9 .  By 1 9 97 most of the substant ive proposals a l ready were on the 
table. For example,  a provision substantial ly s i m il ar to UCC � 9-338 was included as � 
9-335 in the 1 997 drafts of the revised A rticle presented to The American Law Inst i tute 
and the N ational Conference of Commi ssioners on U n i form S tate Laws. 
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Our conj ectures concerning Lhe competence or truthfulness of 
those invo lved wi th formulating and proposing Section 1 03 make us 
uncomfortab le ,  but we know of no other means of exploring the 
possib i l i t ies for how the provision came to be. Understanding the 
process may make it  l ess l ikely that the same mistakes wi l l be made in 
the future, and avoid ing future repeat performances is the chief point of 
our exerc ise . 1 56 
A lthough it appears that the sponsors eventually came to appreciate 
the enorm ity of the detrimental impact that Section 1 03 and some other 
provisions of the B i l l  would have had, 1 57 their approach was structured 
in a way that discouraged constructive debate and sheltered the process 
from essential expert ise .  A more transparent process would have 
attracted the attention of experts, such as the authors of the Report, 
ear l ier in the process .  Had that occurred ,  it is unlikely that Section 1 03 
would have been inc luded in the B i l l .  Section 1 03 was drafted beh ind 
the scenes .  I f  the  B ill  is a fair  example,  and we believe that i t  may be, 
then crony ism is  al ive and well in the world of bankruptcy law 
refonn . 1 s:->  To the best of our knowledge Section l 03 was introduced 
before the sponsors and their staff members consulted with 
organizations of bankruptcy professionals or organizat ions representing 
e ither the users o r  extenders of secured credit . A l though the Bill was 
introduced on Ju ly 2 5 ,  2002, the sponsors ' fi rst pub l i c  statements on it 
were not is sued unt i l  August 1 ,  2002 , immediately before Congress was 
to adjoum unt i l  after Labor Day . 1 59 August is, of course, a time when 
many vacations arc schedu led; it is hard to imagine a period, other than 
year 's  end, during which collective action in opposition to legislation 
would be more d ifficult to organize . 1 60 Moreover, on August 28, 2002 , 
the b i l l \Vas scheduled for a hearing on September 5 before the ful l  
REPORT. supra note 1 2 . a t  1 4  n .20.  During the Article 9 drafting process the Chair of the Article 
9 Drafting Committee. W i l l iam Burke, offered (for himself and o n  behalf of the Repor1crs) to 
meet with or testify before the Commission about the revision. That the offer was not accepted 
strongly suggests the absence of concern. 
1 56 The sponsors and thei r staff members know whom they relied upon for advice conceming 
Section l 03. They may e lect to seek broader expet1 input in the future . One Congressional staff 
member indicated to one of the authors of the Report that neither the staffer nor the legislator for 
whom the staffe r works \\ ould again propose to modify the avo idance powers without first 
consulting cxperic:ncccl expert� in the field of secured tran sact ion� . 
1 57  S enator Durb in introduced a substitute amendment to the B i l l  on September 1 9 , 2002 . 
Section 1 03 was among the provisions the subst i tute amendment deleted. See G .  Ray \Varner, 
Scaled Back Emploree .·1 buse Prevention Bill fVould Elemre Employee Claims, 
http :i/www. abiworld. org/legis/newlegfront.htm l  ( Durbin Substi tute Amendment Analysis) (last 
visited Feb. 1 4. 2004). 
1 5 8  The enormous influence of bankruptcy professionals in the bankruptcy-related legislative 
process over the years is wel l  known. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT ' S  DOM INION: A HISTORY 
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 1 4- 1 6, 80-98 (200 I ) . 
! 59 See supra note 1 1 . 
1 60 Perhaps surpris ing ly, the authors of the Report were ab le to produce it by the day fo l l owing 
Labor Day. 
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S enate Judiciary Committee-affording barely more than a week ' s  
notice to  the publ ic . 1 6 1  Happi ly, the sponsors came to apprec iate the 
strength and power of the opposition to the b i l l  and canceled the 
hearing . l 62 B ankruptcy law is  both high ly technical and very important; 
it has an enmmous impact on transactions and behavior outs ide 
bankruptcy . We would have hoped for a more considered approach 
from our e lected of:ficials . 1 63 
Are there possible solutions that would avoid or render less l ikely 
another Durbin-Delahunt- l ike fiasco? We bel ieve that i t  is worthwhile 
for the organ izations of bankmptcy professionals to explore th is 
question. We can imagine a system for a thorough vetting of a l l  
proposals to modify the Bankruptcy Code. One model is the fo rmal 
j udge-lawyer partnership structure for creating and modifying federal 
rules of p ractice, procedure, and evidence. 1 64 Congress could create, for 
example, a standing committee supported by more special ized advisory 
committees, each populated by lawyers , j udges, and academics .  These 
committees would make recommendations on rev1s1ons of the 
Bankruptcy Code and comment on proposals for rev ision, tak ing into 
account input sol ic ited from the publ ic . 1 65 Whi le  Congress could not 
guarantee not to reverse i ts course ,  such a system could contain 
powerful dis incentives for Congress to ignore i t  by enacting "en d-run" 
legis lation. 
1 6 1  Of this week, the Labor Day weekend and the F riday preceding it comprised four days. 
1 62 0: otice of Full Committee Hearing Postponement (Sept. 3, 2002 ).  m 
http:i/www.senate.gov/ -j udic iary/heari ng.cfm'1id=3 9 5 .  
1 63 To b e  sure, w e  personally have been spoi led b y  o u r  experiences w i th t h e  l aw reform 
processes of the N ational Conference o f  Commissioners on Unifonn State Laws and The 
American Law Institute. 
1 6-1 F or a summary of the process under which these ruies are promulgated, sec The 
Rulemaking Process, on the website of the Judicial Conference of the U n ited States, 
http ://www.uscourts .gov/rulcs/proceduresum.htm. The Judicial  Conferencc: ' s  \\ Ork ts 
coordinated by its Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, often cal led the ·'Standing 
Committee." !d. The Standing Committee considers proposals for revision made by one of the 
five advisory committees (appellate, bankrurtcy, civil ,  criminal, or ev idence). Jd. W ith the 
Standing Committee's approval , an advisory co mmittee may c irculate proposals to lawyers and 
Judges for comment and h o l d  public hearings. hi. When the Standing Committee aprroves a 
recommendation for an amendment and the Judicial  Conference, in tum, approves the Standing 
Committee ' s  recommendation,  the Judicial  Conference reports the reco mme ndation to the 
Supreme Court by May I .  !d. If the Supreme Court adopts the amendment it then transmits the 
amendment to Congress, which can rej ect, modify,  or defer the amendment. ld. Absent 
Congressional action, the amendment becomes effective on the fo l lowing December I .  !d. The 
National  Bankruptcy Review Commission embodies another approach, but it was not successfu l  
i n  achieving any meaningful refom1. 
1 65 For decades the National Bankruptcy Commission ("NBC") has studied he operat ion of 
bankruptcy and related laws and proposals for their reform. See N ational Bankruptcy 
C onference, Mission, available at http ://www.nationalbankmptcyconference .org. (last  visited 
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CONCLUSION 
Section l 03  of the B i l l  began with a bang, and died w ith barely a 
whimper. There i s ,  however, more to the story than the proposal, and 
eventual abandonment, of unwise legis lation. In the end the sponsors 
and their staf s real ized, we surmise, that Section 1 03 was i l l-conceived 
and that they had been b l inds ided by some flawed advice .  
As academics we take very seriously our role in the process of law 
reform on every level ,  whether we act in an official or informal 
capacity. As academics we bel ieve that we must use our knowledge 
carefully and guard our professional reputations tenaciously. In giving 
advice and counsel to lawmakers we should observe a level of care and 
object ivity that is every b i t  as h igh as the duties that would apply in the 
representation of a cl ient .  We should not fear to offer our views 
publicly and candidly. These are the standards and values that we and 
our fel low co-authors of the Report brought to the project. We hope 
that our part i c ipation may have at least some smal l but lasting influence 
with the B i l l ' s  sponsors and their  staffs as we l l  as on the continuing 
process of reforming bankruptcy law. 
